President Donald Trump’s administration asked the D.C. District Court for a stay pending appeal of Judge James Boasberg’s threat of criminal contempt charges.
“The district court’s criminal contempt order instead escalates the constitutional stakes by infringing core executive prerogatives,” the administration wrote. “The Supreme Court has already intervened once, vacating the district court’s March 15, 2025 temporary restraining orders (TROs) and requiring that any further challenges to detention and removal under the Alien Enemies Act proceed in Texas, where plaintiffs are in custody.”
Last month, the Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) banning the government from flying the illegal aliens to El Salvador, citing the Alien Enemies Act.
The TRO came as the planes had already departed from the airport.
The Supreme Court vacated Boasberg’s TRO, finding the venue improper for the case since it was one for Habeas Corpus.
The case should be handled in a Texas court.
Boasberg said SCOTUS’s decision “does not excuse the Government’s violation.”
The administration insisted it complied with the TROs:
Worse, the district court is putting the Executive Branch to these unconstitutional choices to cure a nonexistent case of criminal contempt. Defendants fully complied with the TROs the district court issued, and certainly did not flout any clear, unambiguous command. The court enjoined the Executive Branch from “removing” certain aliens under the Alien Enemies Act (AEA). Thereafter, the Executive undisputedly stopped removing aliens from the United States under that Act. The district court now reasons that “remove” meant legal removal (i.e., transferring custody) not physical removal (i.e., moving from U.S. territory). That is legally wrong—but even the court recognized the meaning of “remove” was at least ambiguous, and contempt cannot lie based on a supposedly wrong reading of a facially ambiguous order.
Margot Cleveland, who has done a great job documenting all these cases, pointed out that the meaning of “remove” is a strong argument for Trump’s administration
“Remove” means “remove” from American territory, which did not happen after the TRO.
This is another biggie: “Third, the district court referred to its oral statements at the hearing directing counsel to ‘inform’ his clients that ‘any plane … that is going to take off or is in the air needs to be returned to the United States.’”
Uh oh. The written order is what matters:
Indeed, under black-letter law across multiple circuits, Defendants had to treat the written order as governing. “Oral statements are not injunctions,” so “[a] judge who proclaims ‘I enjoin you’ and does not follow up with an injunction [in writing] has done nothing.” Bates v. Johnson, 901 F.2d 1424, 1427 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.). Rule 65(d) provides that a TRO or injunction “must … state the reasons why it issued,” “state its terms specifically,” and “describe in reasonable detail—and not by referring to the complaint or other document—the act or acts restrained or required.” Those requirements “contemplate[] … a written order.” Lau v. Meddaugh, 229 F.3d 624, 633 (2d Cir. 1976) (emphasis added). Accordingly, “[i]f an injunction is not recorded in writing, the defendant is under no judicial compulsion.” Landmark Legal Found. v. EPA, 272 F. Supp. 2d 70, 83 (D.D.C. 2003) (emphasis added); see also Hispanics United v. Village of Addison, 248 F.3d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[O]ral statements … under Rule 65(d) have no legal effect.”). “Where the record includes both oral and written rulings,” the “written opinion” is what matters. PlayMakers LLC v. ESPN, Inc., 376 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2004).
The administration argued that the contempt order would force the government to choose between two unconstitutional options:
The administration also argued that “purging” of contempt doesn’t make any sense because it is criminal contempt and not civil:
Alternatively, the district court’s contempt order gives the government just one option “to purge their contempt”: the United States must “assert[] custody of the individuals who were removed” on March 15, 2025. Op.42-43. That avenue lacks any legal basis. Inviting the government to “purge” contempt makes no sense in the context of criminal contempt, which is designed to punish rather than induce compliance. United States v. Perry, 116 F.3d 952, 956 (1st Cir. 1997).
Again, SCOTUS vacated the TRO.
Therefore, it is “improper” to force “the government to successfully execute foreign diplomacy” and crosses the boundary into “the President’s core foreign affairs power.”
“The only way the government could ‘purge’ is by gaining custody of the Tren de Aragua terrorists being held by El Salvador through negotiations with that foreign sovereign,” claimed the administration.
Trump’s administration concluded the Court should grant it mandamus relief:
As explained above, the Government’s right to relief in this case is “clear and indisputable.” The contempt order dangerously intrudes on core executive prerogatives over foreign affairs and prosecutorial discretion, presenting a classic case for mandamus to maintain the Constitution’s separation of powers.
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