Mary recently covered the damning Benghazi report that indicates Hillary Clinton and the rest of the Obama administration focused on managing public relations instead of military assets in response to the 2012 attack in Libya.

However, the mainstream media asserts the 800-page evaluation shows no new evidence of wrongdoing by then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Furthermore, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell praised Clinton as intelligent and capable the day after that report.

One of our best known San Diego bloggers, Barry C. Jacobsen, is a former Green Beret and a military history expert.

He is taking the time to read the full document and analyze various sections through the prism of his Special Ops experience and insight into military tactics.

In other words, a blogger is doing the job the mainstream American press won’t do.  Again.

Jacobsen’s first analysis covers the question: Why did the Marine Corps Fleet Anti-terrorism Security Team (F.A.S.T.) take so long to launch from its base in Rota, Spain to Benghazi?

. . . .  The Marines loaded rapidly and were prepared to depart by 1 pm. However, there was further delay of 4 hours; as decision-makers in Washington debated whether or not the F.A.S.T.platoon should go in uniforms or not (Section 1, p. 154); and whether to deploy with their weapons or without! (To his very great credit, this latter option was dismissed by the Platoon Leader, who refused to consider such a ridiculous option.) Four times the team changed in-and-out of uniform; as conflicting orders continued to come in! The delay was also caused by efforts to get diplomatic permission from the Libyan government (what there was of it). This took fully six more hours. (The Committee failed to discover who was responsible for this farcical display of indecision.)

By the time the F.A.S.T. rescue team actually took off, and landed in Tripoli (not Benghazi), the battle was long over and three more Americans were dead at the Annex.

These delays show the utter lack of preparation and coordination at all levels, an operation that was utterly FUBAR from beginning to end. Only the junior officer commanding the F.A.S.T. platoon at Rota and his men showed the proper alacrity and concern for timeliness necessary to accomplish such a rescue mission as was required of them that night.

Jacobsen plans to continue with this riveting analysis, detailing sections of the 800-page report that most Americans won’t have time to read. His insights will help us understand and appreciate the full scope of the Clinton State Department, which continued its Mogadishu-based-tradition of putting political messaging ahead of sensible military tactics.

The rest of the American press, however, will probably continue its focus on transgenders and climate change.