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Analysis: Government’s laughable arguments in 9th Circuit 2nd Amendment case

Analysis: Government’s laughable arguments in 9th Circuit 2nd Amendment case

LOL: Government attorneys cite Bloomberg’s “Everytown for Gun Safety” to support gun laws

This past Tuesday, the 9th Circuit held oral arguments en banc on two consolidated Second Amendment cases, Peruta v. County of San Diego and Richards v. County of Yolo.

For a bit of background on this matter, please refer to yesterday’s post, “Full 9th Circuit hears ‘Good Cause’ 2A Ruling,” in which we provide this relevant background as well as a discussion of the pro-Second Amendment side of the argument as presented by Attorneys Paul Clement and Alan Gura.

In this post we cover the gun control side of the argument as presented by Attorneys Edward Dumont, for the State of California and San Diego County, and John Whitesides, for Yolo County. We also include the three-minute rebuttals each by Clement and Gura, thus completing the entirety of the en banc hearing.

Video of the full-length en banc hearing can be viewed in here, if you’ve the inclination. Also, a full-length rough transcript of the hearing is embedded at the bottom of this post.

Dumont defends California’s involvement

Dumont’s segment started off on an interesting note, as one of the Circuit judges immediately challenged why he was even present.

So, Mr. Dumont, where were you when we argued this case before? The sheriff now isn’t going ahead, and we questioned at that particular time, we said does the state know about this, oh yeah, they know about that, and we had all the discussions about whether it implicated a statutory scheme, and then the state just sat on its hands and then lost, and here you are. And so suddenly, you know, what, why should we let you intervene, at this point?

[ . . . ]

If it were another case, there would be no way parties would be able to intervene after they’ve, when they’ve known about it they have a clear, it was clearly implicated.

Interestingly, the State of California had originally declined involvement in these cases. Even at the en banc hearing itself, Dumont was representing the interests of California as a courtesy granted by the court, and not as an officially recognized intervener in the case.

Dumont explained the state’s interest in this way:

[B]oth of these cases as they were presented in the complaints in the District Courts, presented a couple of different avenues, and one of them could have been a very broad view, but more particularly they seemed to be focused on the individual exercises of discretion by the sheriffs in these two counties, including allegations that the decisions were being made in an arbitrary way or based on favoritism. Those were not issues that we thought the state had a compelling reason to get involved in the cases for.

Now, as it turns out, the case has been decided on much broader legal grounds, and that is why we are here.

In fact, it seems likely that the state never imagined for a second that a 3-judge panel of the 9th Circuit would ever arrive at a pro-Second Amendment ruling; they probably thought they already had the case in the bag. Now they’re having to fabricate—mostly out of thin air—a legal rationale for being allowed into the case. So far it appears at least some of the Circuit judges remain unconvinced.

There’s also the issue, of course, of California’s standing in the case—or lack thereof. The plaintiff’s lawyers are quite clear that they are not challenging the California statutory scheme for handgun licensing itself, but merely the way two of California’s county sheriffs are applying the “good cause” element of that scheme. That the sheriffs would be parties is patently clear, but the argument for California as a state seems slim at best.

But let us set aside California’s standing issues, and look to Dumont’s substantive arguments.

Dumont makes the case for gun control

First, Dumont took the curious position that the “good cause” provision should be left up to the county sheriffs in order to take into account differences in conditions among the different counties.

The state statutory structure is to give the discretion to define “good cause” and to give the responsibility to define “good cause” to local sheriffs, because conditions may vary from place to place, and a local sheriff locally accountable and aware of local conditions, and it may be that the policy that makes sense is different in Yolo County or San Diego County than from Shasta County or Lassen County.

This is curious because he immediately followed up with the argument that California should simply adopt the “good cause” schemes that have been adopted by other circuits on the far side of the country.

We are here to defend the ability, the constitutionality, of a sheriff imposing the kind of standard that Sheriff Gore and Sheriff Perito have imposed, which is also the kind of standard that New York imposed under its statute, and that’s been upheld by, as you said, in the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Circuits.

Huh. So the need to take into account geographic differences on the one hand, and the sudden disposal of those differences on the other, all in one argument?

At least one judge found the county-by-country variance less than convincing, noting that:

The Second Amendment doesn’t change county-to-county.

Quite right.

Dumont also conceded that the Supreme Court’s Heller decision does have application outside the home, particularly in the context of self-defense.

It is not our view that the Second Amendment has no purchase anywhere outside the home.

This concession rather astonished one judge, who quickly asked:

Pardon me, I took a note here, I just want to make sure I get you right. It is the state’s position that the Heller right can apply outside the home? The core right of a law-abiding and responsible citizen to use a firearm for self-defense can apply outside the home? Yes or no?

Dumont responded essentially, “Yes, but . . . “

While conceding that Heller applied outside the home for purposes of self-defense, Dumont explicitly stated that what California found objectionable to a relaxing of the “good cause” requirement was apparently that there might be a practical realization of the Constitutional right to armed self-defense outside the home, saying:

But what [the plaintiffs] like to do is to define the right as recognized in Heller as the right to do exactly what they want to do, which is carry concealed on the streets and public spaces, in the streets and parks and public squares of San Diego or Davis, and that we do not think that Heller stands for. And let me give you a few reasons for that.

Uh, yeah. That’s the point. And, by the way, precisely how every other county in California deals with the issue, excepting San Diego and Yolo County.

The primary argument Dumont made in support of regulating public carry of a handgun out of practical existence was historical context. This would be a major theme of the other gun control attorney, John Whitesides, and one which Alan Gura would swiftly take out at the knees during his rebuttal.

More specifically, Dumont (and later Whitesides) argued at length that there is a long history of restrictive gun regulation in cities and towns, and that’s really all the “good cause” was seeking to accomplish here.

Our position on that is first, I think there’s a lot of historical evidence that in the context of public spaces in cities and towns, which is what we are talking about here, there is also a long and rich tradition of public regulation of the ability to carry dangerous weapons especially including handguns.

Much of this “historical record,” Dumont points out, could be helpfully found in a brief prepared by “Everytown for Gun Safety,” (no, I’m not kidding) a virulently anti-Second Amendment group funded almost solely by Michael Bloomberg.

Dumont also made a point that would receive even more emphasis by Whitesides, that the constraints on open carry in California were, in his view, modest. In fact, he claimed that in most of the areas of San Diego County and Yolo County it was legal to open carry a firearm. Thus he claimed that even if there is a burden placed on the right, it is a modest burden.

[O]ther ordinary activities for firearms ownership outside the home, purchase, training, sports use, camping, hunting, all of these are accommodated by California’s scheme, and so the fact that you can’t get a concealed weapons permit to allow you to walk upon the streets and in the parks and in the malls and in the parking lots in downtown San Diego or downtown Davis, does not mean that you’re right to carry a firearm outside the home has been destroyed.

What Dumont meant by “open carry” was, of course, the open carry of an unloaded firearm for self-defense. Who could ask for anything more? This ridiculous position would in any case be further eviscerated by Paul Clement during his rebuttal.

Whitesides attempts to defend the burden

Whitesides started off on the same theme on which Dumont had ended: that, shucks, really it was possible to carry a gun almost everywhere in both the relevant counties, and so any burden placed on the Second Amendment was laughably small.

[Y]olo County is 95% rural. And so when we’re talking about whether or not there’s a substantial burden on a fundamental right, and even if we assume that historically the right to carry a loaded firearm in public was generally observed, which we would submit is not the case, but even if you assumed it was, it’s not a substantial burden if your inability to carry is limited to less than 1% of the County.

I mean, if you can go to your relatives’, you can go to your friends, you can go to your neighbors, if you can go to your lawyers, to your accountants, if you can go to your place of business, and do all those things loaded, and then when you get to the grocery store or the bank, and we’ll entertain the fiction that those places would allow you to carry a gun regardless of what state law is, but let’s suppose the bank says, sure, you can come in with your gun, all that’s left are the streets.

And people don’t walk up and down the street, just to walk up and down the street. They walk up and down the street to go in and out of businesses. So this theoretical burden on their right to carry is only going to be impacted if the business they are going to would let them in the door with the gun in the first place.

This was too much for one of the judges, who immediately jumped in:

Let me just understand, because people walk up and down the street for a lot of reasons. You don’t have to be going someplace to be walking down the street. [ . . . ] I mean, if you’re worried about self-defense, you can stroll around in the late evening, you can circumvent a park, you can do all kinds of things, but under your theory that’s OK [the carry restrictions] because if you were in the country there’s no restriction?

Whitesides also conceded to the general premise that Heller’s protections of a gun for self-defense extended beyond the home, as had Dumeont, but with a similar “But . . . “.

WHITESIDES: What I’m saying is that, yes, it’s [the narrowly defined “good cause” requirement that effectively eliminates the carry of a firearm for self-defense outside the home] a restriction, but viewed in the totality of where you can carry it’s a small restriction, it’s not a substantial burden. If you can go 99% of the places you go and carry, the fact that you can’t go to 1% shouldn’t be deemed Constitutionally problematic.

JUDGE: Do you take the position then that you start with the premise Heller extends beyond the home, gives you that Constitutional right outside the home, but then you’re only narrowing it, as you put it, 1% or a very small handful of circumstances? Is that the construct, or do you not agree with that?

WHITESIDES: I do, adding one layer. And the layer I would add is that extending beyond the home, and extending to carry in a public area of a city, are not the same thing.

JUDGE: But I guess what I’m, what’s unusual about you’re argument, I’m hearing you concede that Heller does not restrict self-defense to the home?

WHITESIDES: Correct.

Here Whitesides whipped out the same “Everytown for Gun Safety” brief that had been earlier waved around (figuratively, of course) by Dumont, to argue that there’s a long and rich history of rigorous regulation of gun carrying in towns and cities.

Whitesides also notes that Heller recognized a government interest in restricting the carrying of arms in “sensitive places,” as it surely does, but then sought to define “sensitive places” as not just places like courts and airports, but essentially everywhere outside the four walls of your home.

Another gambit heavily relied upon by Whitesides was a repetitive focus on the argument that there’s no Constitutional right to concealed carry. This is true only if you believe a half-lie to be “true.” The actual relevant law is that a state may prohibit either concealed carry or open carry but not both. Once one is prohibited, then there is a Constitutional right to the other.

Whiteside seeks to argue, of course, that California allows open carry—except, as we will see in Clement’s rebuttal, for almost everywhere in the state.

Whitesides also made a laughable analogy between regulating the carrying of a sidearm for personal protection and the regulation of hunting. He correctly notes that hunting is extraordinarily highly restricted in cities and towns, and is hunting not a fundamental Second Amendment right? These hunting restrictions are not seriously questioned on Constitutional grounds. Should not similarly severe restrictions be Constitutionally acceptable when placed upon carrying of a firearm outside the home for self-defense?

This argument ignores, of course, that bearing arms for self-defense and bearing arms for hunting are profoundly different activities, with profoundly different implications for public safety.

The default position for a person armed in self-defense is that they are not firing a gun. Indeed, they would only be firing if they had the legal justification of being faced with an imminent threat of death or grave bodily harm that could not otherwise be safely avoided. Thus, unless an innocent life is at stake an armed defender in even the most populace city is not firing rounds around the vicinity.

In contrast, hunting can only be realized by precisely the opposite default position—that is, by firing the weapon. Obviously, then, there exists a rationale for constraining such an activity in a high population setting that does simply does not exist in the context of armed self-defense.

(Yes, as a long-ago hunter I realize that not every hunt ends up with shots fired. Nevertheless, that is generally the goal of the exercise, otherwise one need not bother to haul along a firearm in the first place.)

Whitesides then seems to do a 180 on his previous statements on Heller and simply pulls the following out of his, uh, hat:

But we don’t feel in any way that that [the narrowly defined “good cause” requirement that effectively eliminates all carry of firearms outside the home for self-defense] could be deemed a destruction of a fundamental right, because it’s not a fundamental right, historically, and there’s no destruction. At most, there’s a burden, not a substantial one, but yes, there’s a burden. Far less of a burden than there is on hunting. Or smoking.

Finally, he wraps up on an issue that had also arisen earlier in the day—the fact that apparently the defendants in this case, the Counties of San Diego and Yolo, had failed to introduce any evidence that supported their “good cause” policy as being necessary to the substantial government interest of safety. The only evidence they’d submitted had been an affidavit from an academic who claimed that guns are dangerous, therefore carrying guns is dangerous, and therefore restricting the carry of guns would be a legitimate government interest.

Whether and how much evidence the Counties brought to the case is important because under either intermediate or strict scrutiny the burden of proof is placed upon the defendants, not upon the plaintiffs, as would be the case under reasonable basis.

This sole affidavit was deemed so inadequate by the earlier 3-judge panel that the cases were decided against the government defendants on summary judgment, without even bothering to go to full trial.

When asked by the en banc judges whether they lose on grounds of inadequate evidence both Dumont and Whitesides essentially make three arguments: (1) the affidavit should be enough even under intermediate/strict scrutiny and a fundamental Constitutional right; (2) the court should take judicial notice of evidence presented in other “good cause” cases that turned out in the way these defendants would like (however dissimilar those cases were on the facts and law); (3) or that they should be given a “do-over” to try the whole matter again from the beginning.

Clement rebuts the anti-2A arguments

First, Clement notes the degree to which the government has conceded on the issue that Heller applies outside the home:

The first, I think, is the most important, because if I heard the other side correctly they essentially concede that the Second Amendment applies outside the home, and they either conceded or came perilously close to conceding that a ban on both open carry and concealed carry would be unconstitutional.

Clement then systematically dismantles the defendant’s argument suggesting that California actually provides plenty of opportunity for lawful open carry of firearms for self-defense:

So then the question that becomes very important is the scope of open carry under California law. And Mr. Dumont gave you an accurate half the story, but I want to tell you the other half of the story.

Which is under the new law you have open carry prohibited in the cities, which is what they want to talk about, but then he also told you that it’s prohibited in the “prohibited areas in the unincorporated parts of the County.”

Now that means that the key word is “prohibited areas.”

That’s defined in the California Penal Code at 17.0.3.0, to basically mean anywhere you can’t discharge a firearm. And the problem is, that’s almost everywhere.

That’s the streets, that’s anywhere hear a dwelling or an unoccupied dwelling or a car or an unoccupied car.

So please don’t decide this case on the presumption that you can carry openly in 85% of the County that’s unincorporated. Because you can’t carry openly in the prohibited areas of the unincorporated areas, and that’s almost anywhere you would ever get. If you are on the grid, if you are on the streets, if you are near a dwelling, if you are near a car, you cannot carry openly.

Clement also points out the logical fallacy of the 9th Circuit simply adopting the “good cause” findings of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Circuits. There, he notes, there was a single state-wide finding made. In California the issue is not one of state-wide law, but of the sheriffs’ interpretations of how to apply that law.

Gura destroys the “Everytown” brief

Gura quickly destroyed the relevance of the Everytown brief cited by both Dumont and Whitesides, by noting that it was made in a pre-Heller context before the Second Amendment was recognized as an individual right and one which applies to the states, and thus cannot be used as a basis for judgment in a post-Heller world.

The Everytown brief does a fantastic job of marshaling evidence for the proposition that the right to carry guns has been regulated. But there really is no historical basis for this type of law, that dates back earlier than, as the Drake court found, the early part of the 20th century when New York and New Jersey enacted those particular types of regulations.

Well, what else was going on in the earlier part of the 20th century. Well, those were the days of Cruishank, right? The last word from the Supreme Court at that time was that the Second Amendment did not apply to the states.

It cannot be that we look to the legislative behavior of legislatures at that time as to evidence of how people understood the Second Amendment right to exist, because if those legislatures had consulted the Supreme Court’s guidance on the Second Amendment they would be told that they were completely exempt from having to be concerned about it.

Finally, Gura notes that even if the plaintiffs were to concede the government’s argument that carrying guns in public is dangerous, it simply doesn’t matter. Why? Because that policy decision has already been made at the highest level, the United States Constitution:

Even if we were to concede that they are correct, for the sake of argument we’ll tell them, it’s very dangerous to carry handguns, all kinds of terrible things may happen, we would still prevail because right or wrong that judgment has been made in the Constitution, the people have ratified the Second Amendment, and that policy choice has to be respected.

Well, that’s about it. I didn’t cover every point, of course, so I encourage you to read the transcript.

There really was a remarkable contrast between the sound logic and legal reasoning of the plaintiffs’ lawyers Paul Clement and Alan Gura and the ineffectual largely strawman and/or mostly false arguments posited by the government lawyers Edward Dumont and John Whitesides.

Of course, we’re dealing with the most liberal (and, by far, most reversed) federal Circuit court, and my expectation is that they will do whatever needs to be done to come down in favor of the government’s position.

On the other hand, look at what Posner, certainly no conservative, did in Moore v. Madigan.

Hope, I suppose, springs eternal.

As promised, here’s the full-length rough transcript of the entire en banc hearing.

–-Andrew, @LawSelfDefense

Note: This post has been updated to correct some typographical errors.


Attorney Andrew Branca and his firm Law of Self Defense have been providing internationally-recognized expertise in American self-defense law for almost 20 years in the form of blogging, books, live seminars & online training (both accredited for CLE), public speaking engagements, and individualized legal consultation.

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Comments

Andrew, thanks again for this comprehensive summary of the en banc arguments on this case.

I would be particularly interested in seeing the “Good cause” clause stricken as an unconstitutional burden based upon an unequal enforcement of the provision county by county across the State, and thus in violation of the 14th amendment’s “Equal protection” clause.

Does the 14th amendment apply county by county? or State by State? Or would the court take the position that all individuals within the county receive equal protection and thus it does not violate the 14th amendment clause?

Would the plaintiffs even open that avenue of approach? (It seems unlikely given the destruction of the defense’s arguments, but would it be an additional weapon in the plaintiff’s arsenal if necessary?)

“So please don’t decide this case on the presumption that you can carry openly in 85% of the County that’s unincorporated. Because you can’t carry openly in the prohibited areas of the unincorporated areas, and that’s almost anywhere you would ever get.”

Whitesides essentially misrepresented the truth to the Court. It’s one thing to spin; it’s an altogether different thing to deceive.

But Collectivists lie.

Thank you for posting links to full-length hearings. This should become a regular feature, where feasible.

    Gremlin1974 in reply to Valerie. | June 19, 2015 at 3:22 pm

    Andrew always post links to full hearings when they are available. However, not every court allows video or even audio recording so those links many times do not exist. From my experience with his writing if a link is available it will be included.

Believe “Lhasa County” is actually “Lassen County”

    DaveGinOly in reply to CalFed. | June 19, 2015 at 4:20 pm

    Additional errata:

    4th paragraph “en banc” should be italicized
    “The Sheriff know isn’t going ahead” (“know” should be “now,” unless the judge mispoke)(Generally “sheriff” and “attorney” should both be lower case wherever they appear, unless “sheriff” is immediately followed by a sheriff’s proper name – that is when it’s used as a person’s title, and not merely the name of a position of office.)
    “the policy that makes since is different” (“since” should be “sense”)
    “We are here to defend the ability, the Constitutionality” (should be “constitutionality” – lower case “c”)
    “beyond the hope” (“hope” should be “home”)
    “that dates back early than” (“earlier”?)

“Our position on that is first, I think there’s a lot of historical evidence that in the context of public spaces in cities and towns, which is what we are talking about here, there is also a long and rich tradition of public regulation of the ability to carry dangerous weapons especially including handguns.”

I always love the “long and rich tradition” arguments.

Early America had a “long and rich tradition” of race-based (and to a lesser extent, gender-based) oppression and denial of rights; perhaps Dumont would like to defend that, as well?

    Gremlin1974 in reply to Archer. | June 19, 2015 at 3:24 pm

    Ohhh, nicely done. I had actually never thought about it in that context. Thanks for giving me another argument for when I run up against liberal idiots.

To conceal carry or to open carry is the question and so is whether to conceal carry or to open carry an authoritarian fascist state, the latter question’s answer being untenable in either mode for a free people.

Gremlin1974 | June 19, 2015 at 3:26 pm

Frankly, I like how Alaska handles the issue. Unless I am mistaken pretty much anyone of legal age can carry open or concealed.

That just makes things so much simpler doesn’t it. It also acknowledges the right of a free people.

A long post, for those who might be interested.

“The Second Amendment doesn’t change county-to-county.”

I’ve been saying this for decades – in a country in which all States are nominally operating under identical principles of liberty and fundamental identical legal processes one’s constitutional rights shouldn’t change as you displace yourself from one place to another within the country, or within the States themselves. For instance, the PA woman who wandered into NJ with hollow point bullets loaded in her legally-owned and carried weapon suddenly lost her right to the use of those bullets simply by crossing a state line. Where was the due judicial process that caused her loss of rights? There was none, the NJ law was created by a legislative process, affecting the rights of State citizens as well as those entering the State, without affording any of them the due process rights guaranteed in the Constitution.

“The core right of a law-abiding and responsible citizen to use a firearm for self-defense can apply outside the home?”

Yes, naturally. Again, the counter-proposition is another version of location-specific rights – that one loses one’s right to tools that may be necessary to defend one’s life by moving from within a home to spaces outside the home. (Certainly there is no argument that one actually loses one’s right to life simply by moving from inside a home to the outside. But if this is so, why should one lose any other right simply by changing location? Does freedom of the press, or of religion, change from place to place within even the United States, and not just within a single State?)

“But what [the plaintiffs] like to do is to define the right as recognized in Heller as the right to do exactly what they want to do…”

Heaven forbid that mere citizens be allowed to determine how they should enjoy their very own rights! I didn’t realize that our governments were constitutionally empowered to determine for us where, when, and how we can exercise our rights. Of course, we’re too stupid to be trusted to make responsible decisions concerning our own rights.

“…there is also a long and rich tradition of public regulation of the ability to carry dangerous weapons especially including handguns.”

“A long history of not thinking a thing wrong, gives it a superficial appearance of being right, and raises at first a formidable outcry in defense of custom.”
Thomas Paine

Substantial burden? The Bill of Rights stands for the principle that our rights are generally beyond the authority of government. The only method approved by the Constitution for infringement upon, or “burdening,” any rights is via the courts, and judicial process starts with an allegation that an actual crime has been committed. SCOTUS has informed us that the exercise of a right cannot be converted to a crime, so if CA is admitting that their law “burdens” a right, then they’re admitting that people do, in fact, have a right (for instance) to openly carry loaded firearms, but that they have done what SCOTUS prohibits – converted that right to a crime. (I understand that SCOTUS, and other courts, are very inconsistent with their application of the principles of freedom that they have themselves espoused. All I’m asking is that they apply these wonderful principles, which they have recognized in support of other rights, equally to firearms, which they are very reluctant to do.)

“…extending beyond the home, and extending to carry in a public area of a city, are not the same thing.”

What if you live in a downtown apartment building? Does your choice of living location affect your rights? Should it?

“…a state may prohibit either concealed carry or open carry but not both. Once one is prohibited, then there is a Constitutional right to the other.”

Very glad to finally see this in print somewhere. Although it seems that CA regulates the open carry of firearms to such a degree that exercise of the right is effectively not permitted. So Californians can neither carry concealed by right, nor (effectively) can they carry openly, meaning that one or the other (permitting for concealed carry, or the regulations regarding open carry), or both, are unconstitutional because the “bearing” of arms has been reduced to a privilege (licensing) and regulated out of existence (open carry).

“The default position for a person armed in self-defense is that they are not firing a gun.”

This is what makes carrying a gun fundamentally different from driving. A gun being carried in public is holstered (or slung, in the case of a long arm) and only becomes a potential threat to others if actually employed by the bearer. On the other hand, the automobile becomes a threat to everyone in or near its path as soon as it starts to move, and a large part of the operator’s duty is to assure that it remains under his or her control such that injury to others and damage to property does not result. The common use of an automobile represents an imminent and constant threat that a carried weapon does not.

“…guns are dangerous…”

Of course guns are dangerous; they would be of little utility if they were not. But the very fact there is a process through which permits are issued for their concealed carry admits that the State (at least) believes it can mitigate the danger by licensing only those responsible enough to not be a threat to the community.

“Even if we were to concede that they are correct, for the sake of argument we’ll tell them, it’s very dangerous to carry handguns, all kinds of terrible things may happen, we would still prevail because right or wrong that judgment has been made in the Constitution, the people have ratified the Second Amendment, and that policy choice has to be respected.”

That’s gold! Love it.

“It is not our view that the Second Amendment has no purchase anywhere outside the home.”

Ah, the good old double-negative. -5 points from Griffindor.

“…the right to do exactly what they want to do, which is carry concealed on the streets and public spaces…”

Because, as we know, the Second Amendment was originally limited to the right of the people to keep in their basement the disassembled parts of a gun in a locked box for which the State has the only key, said box being permitted to be within the house only during days that do not end in Y. Heaven only knows what one of these irresponsible people might do if they were to carry one where they might be robbed or attacked. /snark

“…If you are on the grid, if you are on the streets, if you are near a dwelling, if you are near a car, you cannot carry openly.”

‘Near’ being defined as ‘within the same state as’ apparently.

The Ninth Circus never fails to amuse. It’s either laugh at them or cry.

Gremlin1974 | June 19, 2015 at 6:08 pm

Well I would bet the ruling is a foregone conclusion, however, I would never have thought a 3 judge panel from the 9th circus would give a summary ruling in favor of the 2nd amendment.

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