A WIN FOR FEMALES!!
The Supreme Court holds that schools can determine eligibility for sports based on biological sex!
“The term ‘sex’ in Title IX, the Javits Amendment, and the Title
IX regulations cannot plausibly be interpreted to refer to anything
other than biological sex,” wrote the majority.
Humans have two sexes: male and female. No matter how many hormones you digest or alter your body, you cannot change your sex.
Idaho bans males from all female sports from elementary school through college.
West Virginia’s law allows males to only play on male or co-ed teams.
Plus, 27 states have similar laws, which are just plain common sense.
The male athletes claim that the laws violate their rights under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.
We wrote in January:
In Little v. Hecox, the lower courts concluded that Idaho violated Hecox’s right to equal protection by basing its determination about who qualifies as “woman or girl” on biology. And in West Virginia v. BPJ, the lower courts asked whether West Virginia may, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX, protect women’s athletics by requiring that participation on female sports teams be limited to biological females.
It is reasonable to separate male and female sports. The majority pointed out:
Separate sports teams for biological males and biological females are reasonable: Given the inherent physical differences between the sexes, allowing only biological females to play on women’s and girls’ teams can reduce the risk of physical injury and ensure fair competition. True, some might prefer a different rule allowing biological males who identify as female to participate on women’s and girls’ sports teams, at least in certain circumstances. But it was surely “reasonable” for HEW [then-Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’ in 1975 to draw a biological line—a line where biological males play only on male sports teams and only biological females play on female sports teams. Even in recent years, 27 States, the NCAA, the USOPC [U.S. Olympic & Paralympic Committee], and the IOC [International Olympic Committee] have all drawn the same line.
The majority also addressed how females face disadvantages in more than the physical aspect:
And as to competitive fairness, allowing biological males to play on women’s and girls’ sports teams can put female athletes at a serious disadvantage. That is because sports are generally zero sum. Allowing a biological male athlete to compete on a girls’ team necessarily displaces or disadvantages a female athlete—replacing her on the roster, knocking her out of the starting lineup, reducing her playing time, depriving her of a medal, and the like. That hard reality of sports cannot be ignored or swept under the rug. On the contrary, that reality must and does inform interpretation of the term “reasonable” in the Javits Amendment.
The absolute nerve that these males claim any violation of their rights under Title IX. As Jane wrote in January, the government passed Title IX to prohibit “sex-based discrimination in school sports.”
“Title IX has always been understood to allow sex-specific sports teams and privacy spaces,” Jane added. “And courts have long held that men and women may be constitutionally separated by biological sex when it comes to sports, according to the West Virginia court filing.”
Both plaintiffs invoked the Equal Protection Clause in the 14th Amendment.
“So the equal protection questions become: What are the States’ interests in maintaining separate teams for males and females, and in limiting female teams to biological females?” according to the majority. “And is the States’ sex based classification—that is, the limitation of women’s and girls’ sports teams to biological females—substantially related to those interests?”
The court agreed “that the interests and competitive fairness are important for purposes of equal protection analysis.” I mean, duh (bold emphasis mine):
And the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the States from applying that same principle to all biological males, including those who identify as female. In the distinctive sports context, in other words, the States may treat all biological males the same and treat all biological females the same, given the inherent physical differences between biological males and biological females.In short, States are not required to conduct an individual-by-individual comparison of the physical and athletic capabilities of all biological males in order to satisfy intermediate scrutiny. Intermediate scrutiny permits a sex-based classification that, as here, is “not invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in certain circumstances.” Michael M., 450 U. S., at 469 (plurality opinion).
Justice Clarence Thomas is a national treasure.
“First, transgender status is not a suspect class requiring heightened equal-protection scrutiny,” Thomas stressed. “The class of people who claim transgender status could more accurately be described as people who are experiencing ‘gender dysphoria,’ which is not a ‘discrete group.'”
Straight to the point (omitted references):
Men and boys with gender dysphoria are not women or girls, even if they believe that they are. Sex is an immutable “biological” characteristic; it is binary; and “man” and “woman,” “boy” and “girl,” are the terms that correspond to adults and children of each sex. To use language to obscure reality—to show “indifference regarding the truth”— is to lie to the public and cease to treat our fellow citizens “as equal[s].”
Yes, the justice who cannot define female stuck to her guns. You guys:
When B. P. J. is sorted onto a team by sex assigned at birth, she doubtless suffers discrimination on the basis of her sex assigned at birth. The same is true, however, of any other athlete sorted in the same manner, regardless of their gender identity. In the context of athletics, the Javits Amendment and resulting regulations instruct that this brand of sex discrimination is permissible: The sexes may generally be separated.All this is true even though the holding of Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U. S. 644 (2020), plainly applies to Title IX. Accord, ante, at 2 4 (GORSUCH, J., concurring); ante, at 31– 33 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). Under Bostock’s reasoning, B. P. J. suffers discrimination on the basis of sex—yes, sex assigned at birth—when she is excluded from the girls’ team because she was assigned male at birth (change her sex assigned at birth to female and her ability to play girls’ sports changes too). But the same is true of a boy who was assigned male at birth. He too is excluded from the girls’ team because he was assigned male at birth. All agree that the Javits Amendment and resulting regulations permit this type of (biological) sex discrimination.
Y’all. I cannot with this woman. I just cannot.
“The prohibition against stereotyping is difficult to explain fully by reference to sex assigned at birth,” Jackson complained.
DUH. Because it’s simple. You’re born a male or female, and you remain a male or female your entire life!
She tried, though:
A sex stereotype often will but need not have anything to do with an individual’s sex assigned at birth. A transgender woman penalized for being perceived as aggressive has experienced discrimination “on the basis of sex” just as much as a cisgender woman has, no matter that the transgender woman’s behavior matches expectations of her sex assigned at birth. Either way, the institution has imposed its gender based expectations upon her. And either way, the institution may have violated Title IX.
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