Perhaps this is the beginning of what I have been calling for, the Supreme Court putting a hold on runaway District Court judges acting as if they are members of the executive branch.
The Supreme Court — over Chief Justice Roberts’ objection — granted a stay of an Order from the Massachusetts District Court compelling the Trump administration to continue paying Department of Education contracts.
From the Order:
PER CURIAM.On March 10, 2025, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts issued what it styled as a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the Government from terminating various education-related grants. The order also requires the Government to pay out past-due grant obligations and to continue paying obligations as they accrue. The District Court’s conclusion rested on a finding that respondents are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 60 Stat. 237. On March 26, the Government filed this application to vacate the District Court’s March 10 order (as extended on March 24) and requested an immediate administrative stay. The application was presented to JUSTICE JACKSON and by her referred to the Court.***As for the remaining stay factors, respondents have not refuted the Government’s representation that it is unlikely to recover the grant funds once they are disbursed. No grantee “promised to return withdrawn funds should its grant termination be reinstated,” and the District Court declined to impose bond. App. to Application To Vacate Order 15a, 17a. By contrast, the Government compellingly argues that respondents would not suffer irreparable harm while the TRO is stayed. Respondents have represented in this litigation that they have the financial wherewithal to keep their programs running. So, if respondents ultimately prevail, they can recover any wrongfully withheld funds through suit in an appropriate forum. And if respondents instead decline to keep the programs operating, then any ensuing irreparable harm would be of their own making. “Such self-imposed costs are not properly the subject of inquiry on a motion for stay.” Cuomo v. NRC, 772 F. 2d 972, 977 (CADC 1985) (per curiam).We construe the application as seeking a stay pending appeal and grant the application. The March 10, 2025 order and March 24, 2025 extension of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, case No. 1:25– cv–10548, is stayed pending the disposition of the appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari, if such a writ is timely sought. Should certiorari be denied, this stay shall terminate automatically. In the event certiorari is granted, the stay shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of this Court.
It is so ordered.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE would deny the application.
MORE TO FOLLOW
Justice Kagan’s dissent was mostly procedural – that it’s premature:
The risk of error increases when this Court decides cases—as here—with barebones briefing, no argument, and scarce time for reflection. Sometimes, the Court must act in that way despite the risk. And there will of course be good-faith disagreements about when that is called for. But in my view, nothing about this case demanded our immediate intervention. Rather than make new law on our emergency docket, we should have allowed the dispute to proceed in the ordinary way. I respectfully dissent.
Justice Jackson’s dissent, joined by Sotomayor, breathed fire:
It is beyond puzzling that a majority of Justices conceive of the Government’s application as an emergency. It is likewise baffling that anyone is persuaded that the equities favor the Government when the Government does not even argue that the lower courts erred in concluding that it likely behaved unlawfully. This application should have been denied for numerous obvious and independent reasons, and the Court does itself—and the legal process—no favors in deciding to grant it.***This Court’s eagerness to insert itself into this early stage of ongoing litigation over the lawfulness of the Department’s actions—even when doing so facilitates the infliction of significant harms on the Plaintiff States, and even though the Government has not bothered to press any argument that the Department’s harm‐causing conduct is lawful—is equal parts unprincipled and unfortunate. It is also entirely unwarranted. We do not ordinarily exercise jurisdiction over TROs, and this one is no different. The Government has not articulated any concrete harm it will suffer if the grant terminations are not implemented in the next three days. And this Court will have every opportunity to address all of the legal issues the Government has hastily shoved up the chain of review, and more, in due course. Because we could have and should have easily denied this application, I respectfully dissent.7
Hopefully we will see a series of stays issued in other cases now on appeal. CJ Roberts wants the normal appeals process to work, but it’s not working. There are serious and substantial systemic concerns that some District Court Judges have wildly overstepped their boundaries and no longer conduct judicial review, they actively manage the executive branch – determining in cases over which they have no jurisdiction who the executive branch hires, fires. pays, contracts with, and how it secures data and provides access to systems.
The only constitutional crisis is that Article III is hijacking Article II.
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