It appears that at least some federal District Courts are refusing to fall for the “hair on fire” antics of the massive pre-planned lawfare project meant to freeze the Trump administration’s control of the executive branch. On February 16, 2025, we pointed out how Court Rejects AFL-CIO Demand For Temporary Restraining Order Against DOGE Access at DOL, HHS, CFPB.
In a Memorandum Opinion and Order issued yesterday, D.C. District Court Judge Randolph D. Moss (Obama appointee, fwiw) rejected a motion for a Temporary Restraining Order prohibiting DOGE from having access to Education Department records related to student loans, finding there was no clear showing of imminent and likely irreparable harm.
From the Order:
Plaintiff, an organization representing students in the University of California school system, moves for an emergency order temporarily restraining Acting Secretary of Education Denise Carter and the Department of Education (collectively, “ED”) “from disclosing information” about Plaintiff’s members “to individuals affiliated with the so-called Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE).” Dkt. 9-4 at 1. Plaintiff further seeks an order requiring ED “to retrieve and safeguard any such information that has already been obtained by and shared or transferred by DOGE or individuals associated with it.” Id. For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion.***The Court, accordingly, starts by considering whether UCSA has made a “clear showing” that “it will likely suffer irreparable harm” in the absence of emergency injunctive relief. Singh v. Berger, 56 F.4th 88, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2022). Because the Court concludes that UCSA has failed to clear that essential hurdle, the Court’s analysis also ends there. The Court leaves for another day consideration of whether USCA’s has standing to sue and has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. Those questions are less clear cut and are better answered on a more complete record.3 ….UCSA is correct that a disclosure of information generally cannot be “undone,” id. at 43, but that is not sufficient to show irreparable harm. What UCSA overlooks is that the context of the dissemination matters. Courts find dissemination of information to be an irreparable injury where, for example, highly sensitive information will be made public, or ends up in the hands of someone with no obligation to keep it confidential….And, by the same token, courts have declined to find irreparable injury where the challenged disclosure is not “public,” but involves individuals obligated to keep it confidential….Here, the Ramada declaration attests that the six employees at issue “understand that—like all Department of Education employees—they must comply with all applicable laws and regulations should they wish to share any information garnered during their work,” Dkt. 16-1 at 4 (Ramada Decl. ¶ 16), and he attests that, to his knowledge, none of the information at issue has been shared with any other “DOGE-affiliated individuals,” Dkt. 18-2 at 3 (Supp. Ramada Decl. ¶ 7). He further attests, moreover, that none of the six employees at issue will access “any tax-related information” without first obtaining the “appropriate authorization,” and even then, those employees will access the information only “for purposes consistent with applicable law, such as conducting analyses to estimate costs related to student loan repayment plans, awards, or debt discharges.” Dkt. 16-1 at 3 (Ramada Decl. ¶ 11). Notably, all of the “applicable laws and regulations,” which Ramada attests the six employees will follow, impose strict limits on the use and disclosure of Privacy Act protected records and tax return information, and they impose criminal penalties and potential civil liability on those who willfully ignore their obligations….UCSA provides no evidence, beyond sheer speculation, that would allow the Court to infer that ED or DOGE staffers will misuse or further disseminate this information.4 ….Finally, the remedies provided in the Privacy Act and the Internal Revenue Code confirm that UCSA’s members are not suffering (and will not suffer) an irreparable harm. In general, injuries are not “irreparable” if there is a “possibility” that “adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d at 297 (quoting Wisc. Gas. Co., 758 F.2d at 674); see Richards v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 453 F.3d 525, 531 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“The general rule is that injunctive relief will not issue when an adequate remedy at law exists.”). Here, both the Privacy Act and the Internal Revenue Code provide a private right of action and money damages for certain unauthorized disclosures. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (authorizing civil penalties for violation of the Privacy Act); 26 U.S.C. § 7431(a) (authorizing civil penalties for violation of § 6103). To the extent UCSA members have been injured by violations of these statutes, and they meet the other requirements for obtaining relief, there is at least a “possibility” of compensatory relief at a later date.
Let’s hope this is a trend, and the District Courts do not allow themselves to be sucked into an unconstitutional usurpation of executive branch authority and policy making based on speculative legal hysteria.
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