The Government Accountability Office (GAO), which provides “the public with timely, fact-based, non-partisan information that can be used to improve government,” recently released a report raising concerns about the Navy’s Columbia Class ballistic (read nuclear) missile submarine program.
“After more than a year of full-scale construction on the lead Columbia submarine, the shipbuilders are facing delays because of challenges with design, materials, and quality.” Making matters worse, the lead shipbuilder on the project, General Dynamics’ Electric Boat Division (Electric Boat), has not conducted a “schedule risk analysis.” “Both GAO leading practices and Department of Defense (DOD) guidance identify schedule risk analysis as a critical tool for understanding and managing program risks that could impact the schedule.” The GAO explains that without the schedule risk analysis being conducted, “programs have limited insight into how schedule risks could affect the likelihood of achieving key program milestones, including delivery, and the amount of margin—or a reserve of extra time—needed to manage critical risks and avoid delays.” The GAO concludes, “[c]hallenges delivering Columbia class submarines on time could have consequences for the nation’s defense.” A detailed discussion follows.
The United States employs three types of submarines.
Fast attack, or just, attack submarines, designated SSN (submarine, nuclear powered), do not carry nuclear weapons, but rather “are designed to seek and destroy enemy submarines and surface ships; project power ashore with Tomahawk cruise missiles and Special Operation Forces (SOF); carry out Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions; [and] support battle group operations.” USS Toledo (SSN-769) is an Improved Los Angeles Class attack submarine that I had the honor to command. Although now an older attack sub, she is still in commission and going strong, as noted by her recent receipt of the 2022 “Battle E,” awarded to the top-rated submarine in each submarine squadron in the calendar year.
Guided missile submarines, designated SSGN (submarine, guided missile capable, nuclear powered), carry up to 154 Tomahawk missiles for powerful conventional cruise missile strikes, and can also carry special operations forces.
Lastly, important here, fleet ballistic missile submarines, designated SSBN (submarine, ballistic missile capable, nuclear powered), carry up to 24 nuclear tipped submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and are capable, while on patrol, of striking almost any target on earth with warheads far more powerful than the one that struck Hiroshima. “The SSBNs’ basic mission is to remain hidden at sea with their SLBMs, so as to deter a nuclear attack on the United States by another country by demonstrating to other countries that the United States has an assured second-strike capability, meaning a survivable system for carrying out a retaliatory nuclear attack.” Although I never served on an SSBN, I did have the opportunity to conduct an observation ride on an Ohio Class sub some years ago, and I was impressed by two things. First, they are massive, twice as large as an attack sub. Second, they are very quiet and the crews train very hard, and I was left with little doubt that if called on to conduct a “retaliatory nuclear attack,” it would happen.
The following two and 1/2 minute Navy video provides a good visual summary:
An SSBN Trident II strategic nuclear ballistic missile test launch is seen here:
One of the problems facing the Navy is that the current SSBN fleet, designated the Ohio Class and consisting of fourteen SSBNs, is aging out:
“The Navy commissioned the lead ship of this fleet in 1981. The first Ohio class SSBN to retire – SSN 730 – will leave service in 2027 and plans are to retire one per year following this. When these submarines retire, they will have been in service over 40 years, longer than any previous submarines. Navy officials have stated that the legacy Ohio fleet cannot be life-extended any longer than what is planned due to aging issues.”
The Navy’s answer to the soon-to-be-retired Ohio Class is new Columbia Class SSBN, show here:
And it is imperative that this sub, with a price tag of $132 billion for the 12-boat program, the lead ship of which is now under construction at Electric Boat, not experience any delays. This could lead to a reduced number of available SSBN assets as the Ohio Class SSBNs begin to decommission. In a worse-case scenario, this could, therefore, cause a potential gap in SSBN deterrent patrol coverage. Or, as the Congressional Research Service puts it: “The [i]issues … include … the risk—due to technical challenges and/or funding-related issues—of a delay in designing and building the lead Columbia-class boat, which could put at risk the Navy’s ability to have the boat ready for its first scheduled deterrent patrol…when it is to deploy in the place of the first retiring Ohio-class SSBN.” However you phrase it, though, it doesn’t take much imagination to realize the seriousness of a situation in which the Nation’s “survivable system for carrying out a retaliatory nuclear attack” is detrimentally impacted.
Nevertheless, the GAO, as mentioned at the beginning of this post, reports that Electric Boat is “facing delays” in constructing the Columbia Class “because of challenges with design, materials, and quality,” and has not conducted a “schedule risk analysis.” Both GAO and DOD “identify schedule risk analysis as a critical tool for understanding and managing program risks that could impact the schedule.” This tool is critical because “without this guidance, and the long-term planning that it enables, the Navy cannot be certain that the fiscal year 2024 budget request will be sufficient to meet the production schedule it has planned.
So why no “schedule risk analysis”? Well, Electric Boat says the Columbia Class SSBN program is “too complex,” and the schedule risk analysis “would not correctly assess risks to achieving the lead submarine’s delivery date,” such as “how they would conduct workarounds when problems arise such as a lack of certain resources.” The GAO disagrees and says that “some government projects, such as at NASA, that are ‘similar and in some cases even greater production duration, cost, and complexity routinely conduct schedule risk analysis to better inform program efforts.'”
The Navy, for its part, says that “they manage the schedule and schedule risk using [scheduling] margin,” inserting “buffer periods ahead of contractual events and milestones to accommodate unforeseen problems.” A Navy spokesman declared that “[t]he Columbia Program continues to execute multiple key risk mitigation activities to promote success in meeting cost, schedule, and performance requirements,” and “[o]verall, the Columbia Program remains on track.”
The GAO remains skeptical, noting that “the last three lead submarines of a new class constructed by Electric Boat were delivered an average of 20 months late.”
The Biden administration in recent months entered into a partnership with Australia centered on its “shared ambition to support Australia in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy.” This quickly prompted Senators Jack Reed of Rhode Island, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and then-ranking Republican James Inhofe to send a letter to President Biden expressing concern that the deal “may be turning into a zero-sum game for scarce, highly advanced U.S. [nuclear submarines]” and noting that “current conditions require a sober assessment of the facts to avoid stressing the U.S. submarine industrial base to the breaking point.”
Underscoring the postulated potential detrimental impact on national strategic deterrence should an SSBN asset reduction occur due to Columbia Class delays, we recently posted about the Russian threat lurking off our shores: U.S. Military Worried About Russian Submarine Strike Capability Lurking Off Our Shores.
And now, a new U.S. Naval Institute report titled “Russian Arctic Threat Growing More Potent,” notes that “despite the heavy toll [Russia’s] invasion into Ukraine has had on its naval infantry, army and special forces,” “Russia’s Northern Fleet’s ballistic missile submarines and strategic (i.e. nuclear weapon) bomber force’s capabilities remain intact.”
“The Arctic remains “of great strategic value to Russia,” Njord Wegge, a professor at the Norwegian Defense University College, said this week as the report was released. On the military side, the Kola Peninsula in the Arctic provides a gateway for Russia’s Northern Fleet’s attack and ballistic missile submarines to move through the Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom [GIUK] gap to reach the Atlantic.”
In sum, there is little in the defense budget as important as the Columbia follow-on ballistic missile submarine project, but issues in the program’s schedule have started to develop and one hopes that the Biden Administration, the Navy and its chosen contractor are approaching the problems with the seriousness required.
CLICK HERE FOR FULL VERSION OF THIS STORY
