Daunte Wright Shooting Trial LIVE: Day 1

Daunte Wright Shooting Trial LIVE: Day 1

Welcome to our coverage of the Kim Potter manslaughter trial over the April 11, 2021, shooting death of Duante Wright in a suburb of Minneapolis, when then-police officer Potter accidentally used her Glock 17 pistol in place of her intended Taser.

In this LIVE post we’ll provide real-time live streaming and commenting on the trial proceedings throughout the day, starting with Judge Regina Chu welcoming the jury, likely reading them the preliminary jury instructions, and then opening statements by the State and defense. For additional insight into the State’s apparent legal strategy to achieve a conviction in this case, be sure to scroll down below the Live Comments section below.

Live Stream

Live Commenting

For some more detailed background on this event and court proceedings to date, see these earlier posts:

Kim Potter Trial: Manslaughter Charged in “Taser! Taser! Taser!” Shooting Death of Duante Wright

Background on the State’s Strategy to Convict on Recklessness

Potter is charged with first-degree manslaughter predicated on reckless use of a firearm, and second-degree manslaughter. The criminal complaint is can be found below, under today’s Live Commenting.

As we have seen in numerous recent politically-charged prosecutions–including the Derek Chauvin trial, the Kyle Rittenhouse trial, the trials of the McMichaels and Bryan over the death of Ahmaud Arbery–the State appears to be basing its hope for conviction on some or all charges brought on a surprisingly broad definition of the legal doctrine of recklessness, a form of mens rea or mental state required for certain crimes, such as the manslaughter charges against Potter.

Generally speaking, conduct is reckless, and thus creates legal liability, when the actor intentionally creates a risk of unjustified death, and then intentionally ignores that risk.  The classic example is that of the drunk driver, who knowingly operates a motor vehicle while under the influence. That conduct is reckless, and if he runs someone over and kills them then the reckless killing is involuntary  manslaughter.

A similarly classic example involving firearms might be that of someone firing a warning shot into the air to disperse some simple trespassers from his property, only to have the bullet enter the 5th story window of a nearby apartment and kill the resident there.

In that example, the intent to create the dangerous circumstances is rather explicit–both the driving while intoxicated and the firing of the shot under presumptively unjustified circumstances are conduct that creates an unjustified risk of death, and the actual driving and shooting is the intentional ignnoring of that risk.

Increasingly, however, I see trials in which prosecutors are trying to cast the next of recklessness in a far wider fashion–and that includes this trial of Kim Potter.

A curious facet of the Potter trial is that it is undisputed that she never intended to create an unjustified risk of death, and never intentionally ignored the risk of which she was unaware.  Nobody was more surprised than Potter when she pressed the trigger of her weapon and she heard a gunshot fired–she having mistakenly presented her Glock 17 9mm pistol instead of the Taser shock device she had intended to use.

Lacking the intent to either create an unjustified risk of death or to ignore that risk unknowingly created, Potter’s conduct might well seem negligent, and thus grounds for civil liability, but not reckless in the technical legal sense.

The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, has made moves in recent years, however, to expand the scope of recklessness specifically in the context of handling firearms.  By recent, I mean primarily 2008, when the state Supreme Court handed down the decision of State v. Engle, 743 N.W.2d 592 (MN Sup. Ct. 2008).  The court’s description of the basic facts of the case is concise, so I’ll just share that here:

On November 2, 2003, Engle, a private security guard, arrived at a St. Paul housing complex to assist a fellow security guard in apprehending a suspected thief.   The suspect attempted to flee, but eventually the guards held him at gunpoint, sitting in the driver’s seat of a stolen car.   Somehow, in the course of removing the suspect from the car, Engle discharged his gun, shooting and paralyzing the suspect.   Both parties concede that the discharge was unintentional.

Engle would be convicted of recklessly discharging a firearm in a municipality, that conviction was affirmed by the court of appeals, and Engle then proceeded to the Minnesota Supreme Court for a final attempt at reversal.

Engle’s argument for reversal was the same as he’d made at trial- that his conduct could not have been reckless as a matter of law, because he never intended the underlying conduct that created the unjustified risk of death–the actual discharge of the pistol.  The firing of the gun was in effect an accidental outcome arising from the physical struggle to remove the suspect of the car.

The trial court reasoned that the relevant legal definition of recklessness in the context of firearms did not require an intent to actually discharge the gun, but merely the intent to engage in conduct while handling the firearm in a manner that it was likely to discharge–in the case of Engle that conduct being the keeping of the gun in hand while struggling to remove the suspect from the car.  The actual discharge of the shot was unintentional, but the holding onto the gun while struggling with the suspect was intentional conduct that created an unjustified risk of death.

The court of appeals would affirm this reasoning and Engle’s conviction, and the Supreme Court would do the same in  State v. Engle, 743 N.W.2d 592 (MN Sup. Ct. 2008).

One can understand, if not necessarily agree with, the public policy rationale for expanding the scope of recklessness in the context of firearms.  The idea seems that firearms, being inherently dangerous instruments, should require an exceptionally high duty of care, essentially a strict liability duty of care.  If you bring a gun into play, you are responsible for any unjustified outcomes of having done so, absent the outcome having been a pure accident without any liability whatever.

Obviously, Potter’s circumstances are distinguishable from those of Engle.

In Engle’s case, he knew he had a gun in hand, knew that he had drawn his pistol in the first place–that was all intentional conduct, as was keeping the gun in hand while struggling to remove the suspect from the car.

In Potter’s case, it seems undisputed that she had no conscious awareness at all that she had presented a Glock 17 pistol or was pointing the muzzle of a pistol at Duante Wright and pressing the trigger of a pistol while doing so–the entire time of her engagement with Wright, Potter believed she was pointing a mere Taser at Wright.

Nevertheless, the State argues that Potter’s conduct can be fairly characterized as reckless handling of a firearm even if she never intended to present a firearm, because Potter did intend to present some weapon, and that intent alone is sufficient intent, in the context of handling a firearm, to qualify as reckless handling of a firearm (the State’s full motion on this issue is embedded below):

Defendant consciously and intentionally acted when she chose to use force and when she reached for, grabbed, and aimed a weapon at Mr. Wright, which resulted in her recklessly handling and using a firearm, despite any unreasonable, subjective belief that it was a Taser.

Judge Regina Chu, presiding over the trial of Kim Potter, has informed the parties that her definition of recklessness will be drawn from the broad view endorsed Engle, which she believes to be the controlling law on the matter, rather than the narrower, more traditional view espoused by the defense, keeping the door open for a conviction on recklessness even absent an intent by Potter to fire a shot or even have a gun in hand.

State’s Motion in Support of Engle View of Recklessness

Criminal Complaint

Until next time:

Remember

You carry a gun so you’re hard to kill.

Know the law so you’re hard to convict.

Stay safe!

–Andrew

Attorney Andrew F. Branca

Donations tax deductible
to the full extent allowed by law.