UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

| UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, | ) | Criminal Action |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | ) | No. 21-140 |
| VS. | ) |  |
|  | ) |  |
| LARRY RENDALL BROCK, | ) | March 17, 2023 |
|  | ) | 11:03 a.m. |
| Defendant. | ) | Washington, D.C. |

TRANSCRIPT OF SENTENCING HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN D. BATES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SENIOR JUDGE

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Proceedings reported by machine shorthand. Transcript produced by computer-aided transcription.

## PROCEEDINGS

THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Your Honor, we have Criminal Action 21-140, United States of America versus Larry Brock.

We have Ms. April Ayers-Perez and Mr. Douglas Meisel representing the government. We have Mr. Charles Burnham representing Mr. Brock, who is here in person. We also have Ms. Kelli Willett representing probation.

THE COURT: All right. We're here for a sentencing in this matter following a bench trial.

Let me first ask you, Mr. Burnham, on behalf of yourself and Mr. Brock, whether you have received the presentence report and had a chance to review it?

And other than the three issues relating to the guideline calculation, are there any other remaining issues in dispute?

MR. BURNHAM: The answer is, yes, we have received the presentence report. Yes, we've had a chance to review. And, no, no objections other than as noted in the report.

THE COURT: All right. And the same series of questions for the government; received, reviewed?

And other than the three issues with respect to the guideline calculation -- that I will address and have you address in a moment -- are there any other issues remaining in dispute?

MS. AYERS-PEREZ: I have received it. I have reviewed it. I have no other issues, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And thank you both.
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
32(i)(3)(A), I will accept the presentence report as findings of fact on issues that are not in dispute.

The case does fall under the sentencing format of 1984, at least for some of the counts, under which Congress created the U.S. Sentencing Commission, and that Commission has issued detailed guidelines for judges to consider in determining the sentence in criminal cases like this.

There are sentencing ranges that have been set for specific offenses, they are all contained in the guidelines manual. But in light of Supreme Court and other decisions, those guidelines are not mandatory, they're advisory; and they must be consulted by the Court and considered by the Court in determining the appropriate sentence in a case but they are simply advisory, not mandatory.

I will in this case assess and determine the proper sentence by referring to and considering the sentencing guidelines in the first instance, but they will be treated as advisory, not mandatory; and there is no presumption that a guideline sentence is the correct sentence. The guidelines will simply be considered along with all other relevant factors.

So we are here because the defendant was found guilty following a bench trial of six offenses. Let me just review those quickly:

Count 1, obstruction of an official proceeding and aiding and abetting in violation of Title 18 of the U.S. Code, Sections 1512(c) (2) and Section 2;

Count 2, entering and remaining in a restricted building and grounds in violation of Title 18 of the U.S. Code Section $1752(\mathrm{a})(1)$;

Count 3, disorderly and disruptive conduct in a restricted building or grounds in violation of Title 18 of the U.S. Code, Section $1752(a)(2)$;

Count 4, entering and remaining on the floor of Congress in violation of 40 U.S.C. Section 5104(e)(2)(A);

Count 5, disorderly conduct in a Capitol Building in violation of Title 40 of the U.S. Code Section 5104(e)(2)(D);

And finally, Count 6, parading, demonstrating, or picketing in a Capitol Building in violation of 40 U.S.C. Section 5104(e)(2)(G).

So the maximum term of imprisonment on the felony charge, which is Count 1, is 20 years. Counts 2 and 3 are both misdemeanors, Class A misdemeanors; and they carry a maximum term of imprisonment of 1 year. And the other three counts, 4, 5, and 6, are Class B misdemeanors carrying a
maximum term of imprisonment of 6 months.
Probation -- my first obligation is to do a guidelines calculation. Probation has done an initial calculation and recommended an offense level of 25 based on the base-offense level and certain additions to that base-offense level and place Mr. Brock in criminal history Category 1, the lowest criminal history, resulting in a 57to 71-month guideline range.

The government has agreed with that, and the defense has not. And its calculation, not giving the enhancements but giving an acceptance of responsibility reduction -- they wind up with a 10- to 16-month guideline range. Quite a difference between the two sides, if you will.

As I said earlier, there are three issues under the guidelines that really drive that calculation. There is the question whether the defendant is entitled to a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, even though he went to trial in this case. Secondly, whether a three-level enhancement for substantial interference with the administration of justice should apply. Finally, whether an eight-level enhancement for causing or threatening to cause physical injury or property damage should apply.

So I want to address all three of those. But in
doing so, first, I want to give each side an opportunity to say anything that they would like to say further on those.

I think, as I usually do in criminal cases, I should start with the government. If you have anything you want to say in support -- I would take it -- of the probation office's calculation, which did not apply the two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and did apply the two enhancements. Then let me hear from you at this time, Ms. Ayers-Perez.

MS. AYERS-PEREZ: Thank you, Your Honor.
I do agree -- or we do agree with the government [sic] -- I'm sorry -- with the government -- yes, we agree with the government -- with probation on the additional enhancement, the eight-level enhancement for the causing or threatening to cause physical injury or property damage, or aiding and abetting in that, and the substantial interference with the administration of justice; that's the three-level enhancement. We also agree that the defendant is not entitled to an acceptance of responsibility decrease.

And starting with the acceptance of responsibility argument, Your Honor, the defendant went to trial. He did stipulate to some matters during trial, but he still contested his guilt on all six counts during the course of that trial. He still pled not guilty.

We still put on evidence. We brought in five
different witnesses. We put on a number of exhibits in the process of proving the defendant's guilt on all six counts. And as part of that process, you know, he hasn't accepted responsibility because he did go to trial and he did plead not guilty. He did say he was not guilty; and he did argue that he was not guilty of all six counts.

Even as we sit here today, in his interview with probation, he said -- and let me make sure I get the exact language, Your Honor -- but he said something along the lines of he still believed it was a peaceful protest, other than those two acts that he saw. For those reasons, he hasn't accepted responsibility and he should not get the benefit of accepting responsibility after going through a trial.

Moving on from there to the enhancements, Your Honor. The three-level enhancement for the substantial interference with the administration of justice -- both of these enhancements and as to their applicability and the wording of "administration of justice," which is, I believe, one part of what the defendant's argument was, have been dealt with with other judges here in the D.C. District.

We agree with a number of judges, Judge Friedrich, Judge Lamberth, Chief Judge Howell, Judge Kelly, Judge Moss, and Judge Cooper, that the administration of justice enhancements in cases arising from the Capitol breach on

January 6th -- that the "administration of justice" definition applies to the conduct that we saw on January 6th from the rioters as a whole, and that the delay -- that the substantial interference with administration of justice -that what was happening in Congress at that time on the House floor and then on the Senate floor as well, and the counting of the Electoral College votes does qualify under "administration of justice," and the definition that we see there in the guidelines and, as such, the three-level enhancement should apply in this case.

Brock was a part of a larger mob that stopped the proceedings from taking place -- not just the initial stop of the proceedings, but the fact that they had to stop for a number of hours as people, including the defendant, were inside the Capitol Building and they were continuing to stop the proceeding by just being there. Brock, in addition to that, was on the Senate Floor where the -- where they were supposed to be debating Arizona at that very moment.

THE COURT: The only judge -- the only judge in this court that has not applied that three-level enhancement did so because he determined that "administration of justice" is a term that refers exclusively to judicial proceedings.

MS. AYERS-PEREZ: Yes, Your Honor. That was Judge McFadden. Yes, he did make that determination.

We disagree with that determination, Your Honor.
We believe that the intent of the guidelines and the Commission, in making that enhancement, was to apply not just to judicial proceedings but to governmental proceedings as well, and proceedings in Congress as well.

In looking at the commentaries -- this is under 2J1.2 of the sentencing guidelines. Looking at the commentary, they give a broad definition of "substantial interference with the administration of justice." It includes: A premature or improper termination of a felony investigation; an indictment, verdict, or any judicial determination based upon perjury, false testimony, or other false --

THE REPORTER: Slow down, please.
THE COURT: You are going way too fast for the court reporter.

MS. AYERS-PEREZ: My apologies.
-- based on perjury, false testimony, or other false evidence -- and this is the really important part, Your Honor: Or the unnecessary expenditure of substantial governmental or court resources.

If this -- if this enhancement was only to apply to judicial proceedings, that would have just been "or court resources." They included --

THE COURT: Well, I don't think that's quite right
because "governmental" is you, quite frankly, in a court proceeding. So I don't think that "court resources" is an indication that it is solely judicial proceedings.

MS. AYERS-PEREZ: Yes, Your Honor.

But also if we look at the enhancements as a whole -- both of the enhancements we're looking at -- this is the plus three and the plus eight -- are the biggest enhancements under 2J1.2, which encompasses a number of obstruction statutes, not just the 1512(c)(2) that we are here on.

Most of those statutes do not cover judicial proceedings as a whole, they cover a more broad understanding of administration of justice. And so the determination of the Commission to include those two big enhancements -- it would not make sense for them to do that and only have it apply to a vast minority of what 2 J1.2 covers.

Chief Judge Howell covered this in the Rubenacker case. She said: There is simply no indication in guideline Section 2J1.2 that the specific offense characteristics containing the phrase 'administration of justice' were meant to apply to only some of the statutes represented to this guideline and not apply to all of the cases involving obstruction of proceedings taking place outside of courts or grand juries. That simply doesn't make sense.

And I would agree with that, Your Honor. It would not make sense for the guidelines to only have that apply to a few of the obstruction statutes that we find under 2J1.2; that it is a more broad definition of "administration of justice" that would include Congressional proceedings like we saw on January 6th and that the defendant and others who were there on January 6th had a substantial interference with, and that would apply to the administration of justice definition under plus -- the plus three enhancement and the plus eight enhancement, which is the causing or threatening to cause physical injury or property damage.

Your Honor, would you -- do you want me to just go over the "administration of justice" or do you want me to go over the actual specific facts with both enhancements as to the --

THE COURT: Whatever argument you think you'll make to me is up to you. You know that I have read the materials and thought about it, so it's not something that you are speaking to a blank wall on.

MS. AYERS-PEREZ: Yes, Your Honor.
When it comes to the plus eight enhancement for the threatening to cause physical injury or property damage, we look to the defendant's words and conduct in the days and weeks and months leading up to January 6th.

THE COURT: Yeah. There is the difference between
the words, and they -- we will be talking about those words at length today. But there is a difference between the words and his conduct because his conduct does not fit -this is the eight-level enhancement we're talking about now.

His conduct does not fit within the language causing or threatening to cause physical injury to a person or property damage on January 6th at the Capitol. His conduct just doesn't fit within that.

What you would do is look back to his words, stretching back to November, and say that those words caused or threatened to cause -- they didn't cause, I don't think. But you would say they threatened to cause physical injury to a person or property?

MS. AYERS-PEREZ: Yes, Your Honor.
His words were violent in nature. They were talking about a specific event, a specific proceeding, and a specific date, on January 6th.

And they weren't just words in the sense that he said those things, he vented, he got it out, and then he was done. He said those things and, then, he bought body armor in December, the month before. And then, he, on January 5th, got on a plane and flew to Washington, D.C. with that body armor.

THE COURT: Well, I know. But his flight to Washington, D.C. and his purchase of body armor may be
important in some ways in the sentencing, but they don't really reflect causing injury to a person or property damage.

The problem I see with the government's argument -- maybe this is an extreme case in terms of the words. But the government's argument would capture a lot of cases for January 6 defendants where the defendants did not engage in any conduct that caused or threatened to cause physical injury or property damage on January 6th, but that they said something earlier on which involved a threat to property damage or physical injury, and you are going to capture a lot of January 6th defendants.

I am not sure that this enhancement of eight levels -- I mean, it's an enhancement that basically more than doubles what the exposure is under the guidelines. I am not sure that this enhancement is meant to capture all of that. It seems to me that it's meant for the specific special circumstance of where someone actually engages in or is on the scene threatening physical injury or property damage.

MS. AYERS-PEREZ: And I would agree with Your Honor that it absolutely encompasses that. The case with this defendant is that his conduct was so egregious --

THE COURT: You mean his words.

MS. AYERS-PEREZ: -- his words were so egregious,
his attire that day backed up his words.
And although we are not aware of any violence that he engaged in that day, he did end up in one of the most sensitive places within the entire Capitol in body armor after having these violent threats --

THE COURT: I don't think -- I don't think winding up in a sensitive place is relevant to this enhancement. It's relevant to the sentencing in other ways, but I don't see how it's relevant to this enhancement.

MS. AYERS-PEREZ: Yes, Your Honor.

Well, moving on from that enhancement then, we're still asking for the 60 months. We're asking for three years of supervised --

THE COURT: I don't want you to -- we're going to hear from -- all I want to hear right now is on the -- the three issues with respect to the guideline calculation.

MS. AYERS-PEREZ: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I will hear further from you in a few minutes.

MS. AYERS-PEREZ: Yes, Your Honor.
Well, that's what I have on those three issues. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Burnham?

MR. BURNHAM: Thank you, Your Honor.
Your Honor, I will start with the acceptance
reduction. As we put out in our papers, the guideline provides for a narrow subset of cases where acceptance might apply, even in the post-trial context. Preserving pretrial issues is the example that's given in the notes, but that's not offered exclusively.

And so what do we have here --
THE COURT: Well, how could you have forfeited those pretrial issues by going to trial? You still could appeal based on those. I don't understand what your preservation argument is.

MR. BURNHAM: Well, if Mr. Brock hadn't gone to trial -- if he would have pled guilty, then he would have waived his -- absent --

THE COURT: So you think he would have waived all of those if he plead guilty?

MR. BURNHAM: He would have waived, that's right.
So that's one part of this. Also, another part of it is a number of defendants in the Capitol --

THE COURT: That means -- that means that anyone who has a pretrial or even -- yeah -- let's call it a pretrial issue.

In your view, if they then go to trial they are preserving appeal on those issues and, therefore, they should get the acceptance of responsibility.

MR. BURNHAM: No, I wouldn't --

THE COURT: I don't think -- I don't think that's either what the language of the relevant provisions, including application notes or how judges have viewed it -it doesn't seem to me that's the approach that's been taken.

MR. BURNHAM: That's the starting point. I
wouldn't -- I wouldn't urge anything that absolute on the Court; that's the first step. I think -- there are two things beyond that that $I$ think are relevant here. One is the nature of the pretrial motions; at least one of them is currently on appeal now to the Court of Appeals, and it was pretty contested.

THE COURT: You mean 1512?
MR. BURNHAM: 1512. I mean, I listened to the argument, perhaps Your Honor did as well. The judges were asking some questions -- it's a real issue, basically. It's different than if there was, you know, a motion to suppress a statement where, you know he started to say -- asked some routine questions. It's not a routine pretrial motion, that's significant. And the same is true with some other issues, venue and so forth. I mean, these are very unusual cases with very unusual legal issues.

Secondly, I think we'd look at the nature of the trial. Now, at one extreme, there were some defendants in criminal cases that did these stipulated trials where they, basically, agreed to all of the facts; and most of them, I
think, did get acceptance. We didn't quite do that. But came pretty close, right?

We agreed to everything we possibly could have. And I even recall a statement Your Honor made -- it might have been at Rule 29, perhaps it was in closing -- where Your Honor even said: This is not really a case where there is a dispute over the facts. This is a case where it's -you know, how the law applies to the legal issues.

THE COURT: No. I think I said that in the context of saying: This is a case that really turns on the dispute with respect to intent.

MR. BURNHAM: Okay. That's right.
THE COURT: The mens rea, and that's an essential part of guilt or not guilt.

So it seems to me that that's just like -- it's no different from disputing facts because it is disputing facts. It's disputing the facts with respect to the mens rea. MR. BURNHAM: We -- that's absolutely right.

We did dispute the mens rea, whether the government had carried the burden. We didn't dispute what happened that day, who he was, where did he go, all that sort of stuff.

So the trial was largely uncontested, with the exception of that one issue. And there were certain things about would he have seen this bike rack. There were issues
here and there. But, for the most part, we agreed to everything, right?

So, really, where that leaves us is, I think there is a case where he should get the two levels because he manifested great -- a high level of acceptance of responsibility, and tried -- we tried our best to limit the areas of contention to just those specific areas where we thought that the Court needed to hear an adversarial presentation of the facts.

Even with regards to the intent of 1512, that's, I think -- hopefully, the Court would agree -- kind of a touchy, legal issue. It's a complicated intent standard of that statute; there weren't that many cases. It's something that the government is making a novel use of the statute. It wasn't an instance where -- it wasn't worthwhile to have the debate in order to allow Your Honor to make the best decision possible.

And so perhaps, as a technical matter, Your Honor will rule against us on that; and we would accept such a ruling without grumbling.

But I want to sort of put a pin in this, in that it -- maybe as a technical matter, if Your Honor doesn't think we get the two points -- it's something that might later inform a variance to reflect Mr. Brock's posture at trial.

Now coming to the 11 levels. Your Honor, I think, framed the issues exactly right with counsel for the government. The easiest way to resolve them is the legal -the legal basis, the administration of justice.

THE COURT: That's the easiest way for you, you mean.

MR. BURNHAM: It is. And I think it's the right way. Honestly, I do think it's the right way.

There is a split amongst the judges but, quite simply, we think the better --

THE COURT: It's another one of these splits that is a lot of judges one way and another judge another way, in terms of the "administration of justice" being limited to judicial proceedings. There's only one judge that has so concluded.

MR. BURNHAM: To my knowledge -- well, one judge in this District did.

Notably, we did cite a case from -- it happens to be from Ms. Ayers home district, the Fifth Circuit. It's the law of that whole circuit that we're right.

So it's really not as one sided as perhaps it might look if we just looked at this courthouse. And there's no reason why the minority view shouldn't turn out to be the right one, and we absolutely think it is.

And I don't think it is -- respectfully, I don't
think it's unusual at all that there would be an enhancement that might only apply to some narrow subset of obstruction cases. I mean, think of all of the enhancements we see. You know, if the conduct violated the 1962 Export Control Act, add three point.

THE COURT: But on that legal issue, wouldn't it be a little odd to interpret the administration of justice -- I am, basically, tracking Chief Judge Howell's view.

Wouldn't it be a little odd to track -- to interpret administrative -- "administration of justice" so narrowly as to be limited to judicial proceedings when all of the statutes referred to and relevant to this provision of the guidelines go well beyond that?

You know, why would the application note and -and the enhancement somehow be limited only to judicial proceedings in this context? It just would seem odd.

MR. BURNHAM: Because that makes the offense more aggravated, right?

There are all sorts of ways to obstruct justice, obstruct official proceedings. But when you are obstructing the very machinery of a court in a judicial proceeding that's, oftentimes, going to be a more aggravated set of facts than other sorts of conduct that the guideline covers, and it's only appropriate that the guidelines would reflect
that.
THE COURT: You would think -- you would think that if that's what the Sentencing Commission was driving at, they would have said so.

MR. BURNHAM: Well, the flip side of that is -- if we take the opposite view, then the "administration of justice" language becomes mere surplusage, right? We're not supposed to interpret guidelines to have language sort of mean nothing. And the government hasn't offered an alternative limiting construction on administrative justice that makes any sense that would substitute for the one we're offering and the one that the Fifth Circuit and Judge McFadden has arrived on.

If it doesn't mean -- "administration of justice" doesn't mean in a court of law, what does it mean? We haven't seen an alternative that makes any sense.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. BURNHAM: So I think that's the right legal answer. The factual answer, I think Your Honor's questions posed to Ms. Ayers are exactly right. The enhancements by their own --

THE COURT: That's only on the eight level. That's not on the three level.

MR. BURNHAM: On the eight level, that's right.
-- by their own terms apply to the offense has to
involve the threats and -- and social media conversations. I am sure we will talk about that. Beforehand, they weren't directed at anybody at the Capitol, they were divorced from it.
"Substantial interference" gets a little bit more of a close call, I suppose but, even then, the Electoral College -- Mr. Brock was one of many, many people who were there that day. And it's common knowledge that the Electoral College met a few hours later and did what they had to do.

THE COURT: Well, wait a minute. Are you really arguing that what occurred on the Capitol did not substantially interfere with the congressional responsibility of certifying the Electoral College results?

MR. BURNHAM: Well, I prefaced my remarks by saying it's a closer question; but I think it's relevant that they accomplished their task a few hours later.

Mr. Brock was one of several thousand people that -- that were there.

THE COURT: Several thousand people is -- what is the interference? He was only one of them, I agree.

MR. BURNHAM: That's right. So that's a closer question. But legally -- if the legal question is resolved in our favor, then that factual inquiry doesn't become necessary.

Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Burnham.
Okay. I am going to resolve those three issues, and then $I$ will do the guideline calculation as a result of that resolution.

So the first issue is acceptance of responsibility, and the guidelines provide that: If the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, the offense level should be decreased by two levels, that's 3E1.1(a) of the guidelines. And in the commentary to that provision it is said that: This adjustment is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt.

But it's further pointed out in 3E1.1(a), the application note 2 that, in rare situations -- and let me underscore that: In rare situations a defendant may clearly demonstrate an acceptance of responsibility for his criminal conduct, even though he exercises his constitutional right to a trial.

So what that is saying is that: If you exercise your constitutional right to a trial, it's going to be rare that you get the acceptance of responsibility adjustment. The example given is that a defendant goes to trial to assert and preserve issues that do not relate to factual
guilt; constitutional challenge, for example. The determination, according to this application note, that a defendant has accepted responsibility will be based primarily upon pretrial statements and conduct.

And as referred, Mr. Brock contends that, even though he went to trial, there were few facts in dispute, and the main issue was how the law applied to the facts. And he proceeded to trial to preserve his right to appeal and did not deny the basic facts of the case.

The government, as you have also heard, disagrees and argues that Mr. Brock contested essential factual elements of guilt at trial, such as denying that he went to the Capitol to stop the certification, denying that he dressed in tactical gear to support the mission to storm the Capitol and stop the certification, and denying that he had picked up and held on to Flex Cuffs.

So those were factual issues and they relate, to some extent, to the question of mens rea, which is often an important issue in these January 6th cases. It's not unusual that we're going to see either the facts stipulated to or the facts really not being in that much dispute, except facts relating to mens rea, the intent requirement, the knowingly or the willfully, depending upon the provision at issue, and that is an essential aspect of the determination of guilt and it does depend on factual
assessment based on the evidence at trial.

I am not sure that any other January 6 defendant who has gone to trial, other than perhaps with a stipulated trial -- I am not even sure about those -- but I am not sure that any other January 6 defendant who has gone to trial has actually received an acceptance of responsibility reduction at sentencing.

I have reviewed cases -- I've reviewed ten cases, for example, from various judges, all of whom denied acceptance of responsibility requests in the context of defendants who went to trial. So the overwhelming volume of cases, and perhaps the exclusive volume of cases, is not to award an acceptance of responsibility reduction in the context where a January 6th defendant has gone to trial and, particularly, in the context where there isn't a stipulation of guilt as to any charge or stipulated facts and there is an argument that the requisite mens rea for guilt had not been proven by the government on the facts.

So the government was put to the proof on that issue and some other factual issues respecting Mr. Brock's guilt or innocence. And as the government has said, I think that amounts to disputed issues relating to his factual guilt. And even though there is a legitimate question with respect to some legal issues and preservation of those issues for appeal, nonetheless, I think that we are in a
situation where there is a real dispute as to factual guilt here and an argument that there was not -- that the government wouldn't be able to prove -- and they were put to their proof on the requisite mens rea level -- and, therefore, for that reason, I am going to deny a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility.

With respect to the three-level enhancement under Section 2J1.2(b)(2) of the guidelines, that applies where the offense resulted in substantial interference with the administration of justice and substantial interference. In the application note 1 is defined to include the unnecessary expenditure of substantial government resources.

Both probation and the government argue that the enhancement does apply because the riot resulted in evacuations of Congressional members and personnel, delay of the vote count, injuries to many law enforcement officers, more than $\$ 2.8$ million in property damage loss, and so many law enforcement resources from all over the D.C. metropolitan area to assist in protecting the Capitol. On the other hand, Mr. Brock contends on the legal issue that the phrase administration of justice refers to judicial proceedings, and one judge has so concluded in this District. And I am not saying there isn't some support from elsewhere on that, but the overwhelming view of the judges in this court is that the three-level enhancement should be
applied in 1512(c) sentencings.
And I think the lead case is probably Chief Judge Howell's decision in United States versus Rubenacker. She has gone through the legal question on "administration of justice," and I adopt her assessment in that case. I also adopt the assessment that only a general causal tie is necessary between the defendant's actions and the unnecessary expenditures by the government and that the government only has to show a causal line from the mob -the group of participants including the defendant -- that collectively resulted in a situation causing unnecessary expenditure of substantial government resources.

I also agree with Chief Judge Howell in her conclusion that this enhancement applies because -- or where a defendant's conduct contributed to this unnecessary expenditure of substantial government resources during and after the riot and resulted in substantial interference with the administration of justice.

As I have said, other judges have followed suit. There are many judges who have agreed that the "administration of justice" encompasses an official proceeding of Congress and that defendants convicted under 1512 should receive that enhancement based on facts similar to what we have here, and I so conclude.

I believe that the view of one judge on the legal
issue is not correct. I agree with the other judges of this court on that legal issue and on the application of this enhancement in circumstances such as this.

Mr. Brock was convicted of obstructing an official proceeding. He was part of the mob that caused substantial damage at the Capitol and large expenditure of government resources and, therefore, I will apply that three-level enhancement.

The eight-level enhancement, however, is a different question; that is under 2J1.2(1)(B). It applies if the offense involved causing or threatening to cause physical injury to a person or property damage in order to obstruct the administration of justice.

Again, the legal issue of administration of justice, as defined, I agree with Chief Judge Howell as it applies to this enhancement as well.

The government, however, notes that Mr. Brock used very dangerous and even violent rhetoric in the time -days, weeks, even months -- leading up to January 6th. And even though he didn't engage in such conduct, violent or inflicting property damage at the Capitol, he marched inside the Capitol Building to various locations as they have said, including sensitive locations, while holding Flex Cuffs, dressed in a helmet, and a military-style tactical vest. This is a fact-sensitive determination $I$ believe.

The cases are a little bit mixed. In cases where the defendant committed physical acts of violence or took actions that disrupted or destroyed property in the Capitol, courts apply this enhancement, and I think properly so. But in cases that more resemble Mr. Brock's circumstances they are less likely to order application of this enhancement.

I think that two cases that I agree with -- one is that same case I believe by Judge McFadden did not apply this enhancement, and $I$ think correctly. And in United States versus Wood, Judge Meta concluded that there was nothing in the terms of words or conduct that rises to an eight-level enhancement for causing or threatening to cause physical injury to a person or property damage; and I think that's true here, notwithstanding the social media posts. They are a little bit removed and, hence, attenuated from actual threats or causing physical damage.

It is rhetoric. It is concerning rhetoric and it is relevant to the sentencing here, but I do not believe that that rhetoric is sufficient to apply this very considerable enhancement. To do so based solely on what someone -- a January 6th defendant has said prior to the date, prior to the events at the Capitol, would sweep in, I fear, many January 6th defendants who have not actually caused or threatened physical injury to a person or property damage while they were involved in the events of January 6.

Yes, there is a little bit more here. Mr. Brock did carry Flex Cuffs. I think all have now concluded that he did not bring them to the Capitol; he found them there and then held on to them. And he wore tactical gear including a helmet. But I don't think that -- even though that is somewhat threatening, I don't think it's enough to satisfy the requirements of this enhancement of causing or threatening physical injury to a person or property damage in terms of the events of January 6th. I will not apply that enhancement here.

I will, as I said, weigh the violent and threatening rhetoric and social media posts elsewhere in the 3553 analysis for sentencing purposes.

So what this means is -- as I will explain in a second -- that I will deny the two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. I will apply the three-level enhancement for substantial interference with the administration of justice, but deny the eight-level enhancement for causing or threatening to cause physical injury to a person or property damage. And the result will be an offense level much lower, Level 17. The guideline level as well is going to be much lower, instead of 57 to 71 months, it's 24 to 30 months. Let me go through that calculation right now because that is my obligation under the 2021 guidelines manual.

There are six counts. The applicable guideline for Count 1 is 2J1.2; for Count 2, it's 2B2.3, which does cross reference to 2J1.2; and for Count 3, it's 2A2.4.

The other three counts, Counts 4, 5, and 6, do not apply. The guidelines do not apply to any count of conviction that is a Class B misdemeanor and, therefore, the sentencing guidelines don't apply to those counts.

But on these three counts, Counts 1, 2, 3, they are grouped under the guideline calculation because they involve the same victim and two or more acts or transactions connected by a common criminal objective; and, therefore, you look for the guideline that produces the highest offense level within the group, and that is 2J1.2, as applied to the obstruction charge, the only felony charge which is in Count 1. That section, 2J1.2, provides that: An offense involving obstruction of an official proceeding has a base-offense level of 14; and that's under 2J1.2(a).

I am not applying the eight-level increase, but I am applying the three-level increase under the special offense characteristic of an offense resulting in substantial interference with the administration of justice, that is, the Electoral College vote by Congress; and that is under guideline Section 2J1.2(b)(2). That results in an adjusted offense level of 17.

There is no acceptance of responsibility that I am
applying here, so the total offense level remains at a Level 17.

With respect to criminal history, there are no prior convictions of any relevance and no criminal history points and, therefore, Mr. Brock is in the lowest criminal history category, which is a Category 1.

For an offense Level 17 and a criminal history Category 1, the guideline range, as I have said already, is 24 to 30 months, less than half of the 57- to 71-month level that would have applied if that eight-level enhancement had been applied as well.

So any objection to those conclusions as to appropriate offense level, criminal history category and advisory guideline range -- other than what has already been argued today, any other objections to those conclusions from the defense?

MR. BURNHAM: No further objections.
THE COURT: And from the government?

MS. AYERS-PEREZ: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. As I have said, the guidelines are advisory, they will be considered fully by the Court, along with all other relevant factors, but they are advisory only.

And now it's time for me to be quiet and to listen to, first, the government, then the defense, through

Mr. Burnham. And then, if Mr. Brock wishes to address the Court, to listen to him as well.

We'll start with you, Ms. Ayers-Perez, once again.
MS. AYERS-PEREZ: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I repeat. I have read everything submitted closely and, of course, I listened closely during the bench trial, so I am very familiar with the evidence and the arguments.

MS. AYERS-PEREZ: Yes, Your Honor.

I do want to touch on a few key points here that were really of the most concerning nature that we heard during the bench trial and that has been written into the government's sentencing memorandum.

The words and conduct, the rhetoric of the defendant in the days and weeks and months leading up to January 6th was of some of the worst nature that I personally have heard in any of these cases.

The defendant talked about killing law enforcement if necessary, gas assisting in this if we can get it, to attempt to capture democrats with knowledge of the coup; that the Supreme Court and Congress are the last two peaceful options.

He states: I prefer outright insurrection at this point. He says, "Do you want to see some panic? Start playing the purge of siren outside the Capitol on January 6,
watch Nancy flee."
And then he says, a few days before January 6th, "Biden won't be inaugurated, we will ensure that on the 6th." And again, "Necessary to restore the public -- it is necessary to restore the republic through force of arms."

He then, in December of 2020, had -- and I am not going to read this in its entirety, Your Honor. But he had what could be referred to as a manifesto of sorts, where he sent a list to a fellow military member --

THE COURT: Former.
MS. AYERS-PEREZ: -- former. I apologize,
Your Honor. Former.
And he list out tasks, some of which include seizing Democratic politicians and select Republicans, Biden key staff. Some rules of engagement, which is where we get the: Do not kill law enforcement officers unless necessary; attempt to capture democrats, shoot and destroy enemy communication notes.

These were horrific -- this was horrific rhetoric. And it wasn't just words in the sense that he said this and then stopped and did nothing. He then bought combat gear. He then went to Washington, D.C. He wore that combat gear to enter the United States Capitol Building.

Of note, he went to the Stop the Steal Rally prior to going to the Capitol Building, and he did not wear his
helmet when he was at the Stop the Steal Rally. When he was marching from the rally to the Capitol Building, he still did not wear his helmet. He did not put it on -- or at least the first time we see it on is when he is outside the scaffolding on the west side of the Capitol Building, already on property, getting ready to go up the west side and eventually enter through the Senate Wing doors.

Brock would have seen lots of signs of the violence that had been taking place at the Capitol that day. He entered through a broken door, there were broken windows surrounding that door, glass on the ground.

When he picked up the Flex Cuffs outside the Rotunda -- and we do agree that he picked them up there inside the Capitol Building -- it was while officers were barricading the doors, the east Rotunda doors, from the crowded mob outside who was trying to enter.

He then took those Flex Cuffs and went upstairs to outside the Senate Gallery. Interestingly enough, Sergeant Timberlake testified that he never saw the Flex Cuffs that Brock had when he was standing right next to Brock outside the Senate Gallery. But just a minute later, Brock is on the gallery -- in the gallery area, he is shouting at his fellow rioters, and he's holding the Flex Cuffs at that point.

It is interesting and disturbing that he was
continuing to either put them in his jacket or take them out and continuing to utilize them and not handing them to law enforcement or doing anything with them that a reasonable person who did not intend to use them would do in that moment.

Once inside the Senate Gallery, he then left, went downstairs and grabbed a set of keys that -- we don't know from where, they were never recovered, and attempted to enter a door onto the Senate floor, the same door that 21 minutes prior Vice President Pence had fled the Senate Floor from. He then goes around to the other --

THE COURT: He didn't -- he didn't know what was behind the door, did he?

MS. AYERS-PEREZ: He was just up in the Senate Gallery and went right downstairs, so he would know the Senate was there.

I don't -- I don't see any evidence he knew that Vice President Pence came out of there. But it was clear that he knew the Senate Floor was there because he then walks around and enters the Senate Floor when the door is opened. He proceeds to riffle through paperwork that is on senators' desks. He's in combat gear on our Senate Floor on January 6th shouting commands such as: This is an IO war [sic], which we heard extensively about during the bench trial and Agent Moore testified to as to the definition of
that.
He was inside the Capitol for approximately 37 minutes, and then, within days, gave an interview to the New Yorker and said: It was a peaceful protest.

There was nothing peaceful from what Larry Brock would have seen. He walked through evidence of violent activity that was occurring at the Capitol. He found his way into the most -- or one of the most sensitive areas of the Capitol Building on January 6th, and the whole time he is talking about an "IO war," which is -- which leads us back to this rhetoric that he had in the days and weeks and months leading up to January 6th where he's talking about an "IO war." He is talking about gathering information on January 6th, and then he goes through the process of actually trying to achieve that.

One of the questions Your Honor asked during -during either the Rule 29 hearing or the closing arguments at the bench trial is whether the defendant would actually have achieved this; and I am referring to this manifesto from December 24, 2020, that he included in a Facebook message.

And although I am not aware that he would have the infrastructure, personnel, or financial infrastructure to do something like this, the fact that he even made those comments, put that into writing and then, less than a month
later, ended up on the Senate Floor in combat gear is seriously disturbing, and it's unique to him -THE COURT: It's actually less than two weeks. MS. AYERS-PEREZ: Yes, Your Honor. And it's unique to him compared to other January 6th defendants.

There have been, of course, violent rhetoric throughout. But this rhetoric of Larry Brock is to such an extreme nature, and to then act on that rhetoric is as disturbing as it gets, Your Honor.

We originally, in our sentencing memo, had asked for 60 months. We renew that. Even though there is a new guideline range, we are still asking for 60 months in custody for the defendant, for three years of supervised release, a $\$ 2,000$ restitution payment, which would be his portion of the damages that happened to the Capitol Building on January 6th, and the special assessments as are laid out for each of the counts, Your Honor.

Your Honor, I would just reiterate that this is -the violence and the behavior we saw from Larry Brock -- or the violent language we saw from Larry Brock is unique to him, and it is something that should absolutely be considered in the amount of time that he would serve in custody because of this.

He also told the probation officer, Ms. Willett,
that -- he again referred to it as a peaceful protest other than the two incidents in which he helped out some of the violence that he saw.

And this is once again -- even after going through a three-day bench trial and seeing the evidence presented of the violence at the Capitol, this is, once again, the defendant not accepting responsibility for what he did and mitigating his role on January 6 th and what he saw on January 6th.

We are now over two years later; and that is also concerning, that he is still not accepting what actually happened on January 6th, Your Honor. And for those reasons, we would ask for the 60 months and the other conditions as I have stated and as are laid out in my sentencing memo.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much.
Mr. Burnham.
MR. BURNHAM: Thank you, Your Honor.
Your Honor, I will start with Mr. Brock's
background and sort of work forward from there. But in my discussion of his background, I'm really offering that for two purposes: One, because that is a 3553 factor in and of itself; and secondly, it's relevant to considering whether Mr. Brock's personal background is either consistent or inconsistent with the motives the government is still arguing to ascribe to him well beyond the mens rea necessary
for conviction for the 1512 and the other offenses. So those are the purposes for which I am offering it.

So let's start. I mean, Mr. Brock's background -Your Honor has read it, I will just mention a few things -it's absolutely commendable, almost from beginning to end.

He comes from humble origins, but was second in his class in high school. He could have gone to Harvard perhaps with grades like that. He could have been a doctor and become, you know, a multimillionaire, all sorts of things, but he chose to go to the Air Force Academy.

THE COURT: Everybody who goes to an Ivy League college does not become a multimillionaire.

MR. BURNHAM: Well, he had the opportunity to pursue, you know, a career that would be more lucrative than the military. He chose to serve in the military, that's the takeaway.

His military service is obviously -- that's
significant. I will make -- three points about it, I think, stand out. One is the length and time period during which he served was during -- during a time in our history when -unlike when my dad was in the Army, he was -- you are getting deployed all the time in the war on terror; and he served during that particularly challenging time. It was tough on families, and his family wasn't immune to some of the challenges of that. But he stayed in the military
longer than his commitment to the Air Force Academy, deploying over and over again. That's highly significant. Secondly, all military service is highly commendable, but there is a special place of honor, I think, within military and without for those who are in harm's way, getting shot at, and that was for most of the time. Even as a civilian, Mr. Brock's service was -- was of that nature. And finally, all decorations are something to be proud of; but decorations for valor, I think, carry their own significance, and Mr. Brock received those, five -- five air medals, which criteria for that are either for service above and beyond the call of duty in the face of the enemy. And we think that's highly significant and distinguishes Mr. Brock from many, many other January 6th cases, and I will allude back to that.

Now, coming to the facts of this case, I will say two things about the social media.

Firstly, it's clear that -- that Mr. Brock felt strongly about the 2020 election, and he wasn't alone in that. There were public figures that had those concerns. Major news networks gave them concerns about the election, a respectful hearing, the President of the United States. It's a factual opinion that he had that -- that, in and of itself, is not either aggravating or mitigating, it's just -- that's his factual opinion. We don't think that
should drive sentencing, his particular substance of his opinions.

THE COURT: Not everyone who feels strongly or felt strongly about the results of the 2020 election advocated violent insurrection.

MR. BURNHAM: Well -- and I want to address exactly that.

What do we make of these statements the government is relying on?

Well, first of all, what is the context, right?
In American political rhetoric, revolutionary
imagery is -- he is not the only one that speaks in those terms. I mean, think of the tea party. Not that long ago political activity involved people wearing tri-cornered hats and dressing up like revolutionary patriots. And what's the purpose of that? They were consciously emulating individuals who overthrew the government by force.

They weren't trying to overthrow the government by force, that's just the political terms in which it's part of our national DNA to invoke that legacy.

And that is not only on the right.
I mean, there is a famous example of a more to the left side celebrity comedian who famously held up Trump's severed head with blood dripping off of it, right? I mean, it's -- rhetoric has coarsened in recent years, and

Mr. Brock isn't -- isn't immune from that at all.
So I think the correct framework, I guess I would say, for evaluating the significance of his social media record is to take the statements and ask the Court -inquiry as to what extent do they correspond to reality, to his actions and to his -- to what the Court knows about his history and personal characteristics leading up until that point.

In many, many January 6 cases there is overheated social media rhetoric. There is almost -- my impression is that's the rule rather than the exception. I don't at all concede the government's argument that Mr. Brock's rhetoric is necessarily that much worse than others that I have come across. Even one of the cases they have cited as a comparator case has literal white supremacist media activity. I mean, there's all sorts of stuff that these search warrants --

THE COURT: Well, I can't -- I can't profess to be familiar with every case and the rhetoric in every case, but I am familiar with a slice of those cases -- a considerable slice of those cases, either from handling the cases or from research involved in looking at sentencing issues.

I think it's fair to say that his rhetoric is on the far end of how extreme it is.

MR. BURNHAM: Well, I will even work within

Your Honor's frame, I am happy to do that. Because I continue to posit that the -- the most informative inquiry is not how bad is the rhetoric -- we can debate that -- but to what extent does it correspond to reality?

There certainly are some January 6th cases, including the Pruitt case the government relies on that I alluded to a moment ago where you have outrageous rhetoric; that gentleman had a social media record of that nature, and then you look at what are the facts of the case. And there you had an individual who was a member of an alleged paramilitary organization that had manpower they could command, that allegedly made preparations to deploy that manpower -- according to the indictments anyway -- in an organized way on January 6th.

So there is a case I could see where you would say, okay, you've got this rhetoric. And when you match up to the reality, well, there is some reason to be concerned here.

So let's take that same analysis and apply it to Mr. Brock. I will head on -- I'll take the most inflammatory, perhaps, passage that the government relies on, which is this -- I think it was Christmas Eve six-point plan.

First of all, you know, by its own terms, the preface of it is: If Congress fails to act on January 6th.

And, arguably, it wouldn't even be applicable to the facts of the case because at that point Congress's decision wasn't finalized. But even apart from that, the -- it was two military buddies talking to each other, special forces and a fighter pilot, you know, they're a couple of tough guys. The conclusion is so many subtasks, I can't even imagine them. I am quoting here from the government's sentencing memorandum.

So the -- turning from this social media post and others, we go and say, okay, what did Mr. Brock actually do that might roughly correspond to this?

And I will go ahead and take it in the light most favorable to the government. If we're tallying it up, we'll say -- we'll give the government that he got on a plane, he went to D.C., that he wound up inside the Capitol, and he was wearing a helmet and a vest. We'll put three chalk marks in their favor on that side of it.

THE COURT: You're giving that to the government?

MR. BURNHAM: Taking that in the view most favorable to the government.

THE COURT: I think I have already given those to the government.

MR. BURNHAM: For the purposes of my argument, I am setting it up that way --

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. BURNHAM: So what -- that's half the inquiry. The other half of the inquiry is what's on the other side?

If the government's allegation -- or the way I
take it: If this was a real plan, it is not believable that he would do all of this by himself. He is not single-handedly going to overthrow the government. Naturally you would think he would go out and try to find people. I could use a little help, I want to overthrow the government --

THE COURT: Well, he never was charged with any real plan.

MR. BURNHAM: That's right.
THE COURT: He never was charged with any attempt to engage in seditious conduct or other --

MR. BURNHAM: That's right.
THE COURT: -- elements of the plan and the rules of engagement that he set forth.

MR. BURNHAM: Right.

THE COURT: So nobody ever concluded that he was attempting to effectuate that.

MR. BURNHAM: Well, the government -- the way I understand the argument is they're arguing that as a sentencing factor, not a charge --

THE COURT: Right.
MR. BURNHAM: This was not something he was saying
in jest or as a thought experiment or --
THE COURT: Right. And in the cases -- in the January 6th cases wouldn't you agree that judges have taken social media into account, even if that social media was by an individual who had no means to effectuate it?

MR. BURNHAM: Well, it's a question of weight. And it's not just that he had no means, that he didn't even take basic steps to -- that he could have taken to acquire the means. The government -- the point $I$ am making is the government went through all his Facebook messages, they went through his phone. They interviewed at least some of his acquaintances. And they didn't find a single post on a forum saying: I am going to be in January 6th, some rough stuff might go down, do you want to meet up and talk?

They didn't find him reaching out to any of his military buddies saying: Do you want to go together, we might have to -- you know.

THE COURT: I guess he only took one affirmative step to engage in the civil war that he mentioned. He bought a tactical vest, body armor, and a helmet.

MR. BURNHAM: Your Honor, these are arguments that
I have made. I suppose the Court didn't find them as persuasive as I thought they were, there were other reasons to dress that way.

Many of the government's witnesses conceded --

THE COURT: I am, basically, quoting what he said on December 24th: I bought myself body armor and a helmet for the civil war that is coming.

MR. BURNHAM: Well, that doesn't refer to January 6th.

THE COURT: Oh, come on.
MR. BURNHAM: Well, many of -- many of Mr. Brock's social media commentary isn't specifically tied to January 6th; it deals with the whole election process, larger societal issues. It's not tied to it.

And there was evidence that came out at trial, that there were reasons why a reasonable person would want to have some level of personal protective equipment on that day.

THE COURT: But that's not why he bought it. He didn't buy it because he needed, in his mind -- you know, if you look at that post, and in terms of any evidence at the trial, there is no evidence that he bought it -- you can argue that, and you have argued that. But there is no evidence that he bought it in order to protect himself against Antifa or some other insurrectionist from the left side.

MR. BURNHAM: Well, taking the -- taking the message by itself, I can understand that argument. But let's continue the thought experiment --

THE COURT: Please.
MR. BURNHAM: If he did buy the helmet and the vest to start a civil war or participate in one that somebody else started, the next question is: How would he have -- how would someone with that mentality have behaved on the day itself?

If that was his objective in traveling to D.C., likely, he would have been among the individuals who were initially -- the ones who were most ready to go to the Capitol and -- and start what happened. He would have been the one that was there at the bike racks initially with the pushing and shoving. He would have been the one who was the first, second, tenth, or fifteenth person who went into the Capitol if that was his mentality.

But what does the government's evidence show? He was there listening to the President's speech. And by the time he made the -- there is the one -- one shot of him walking from the Ellipse to the Capitol, and that isn't -doesn't have the look of a man with any particular sense of urgency. He is sitting there looking at his phone, seemingly walking at a leisurely pace.

And by the time he arrives at the Capitol, the entrances and the battles with police have already come and gone, that's inconsistent with an individual whose purpose is to start a civil war or take politicians by force. And
that -- that behavior pattern continues to exhibit itself when he enters the building itself.

The first thing he does -- if he was there to take hostages or start a civil war, you would expect him to behave like a man on a mission.

But what is the first thing he does --

THE COURT: Look. You don't have to convince me that he didn't take actions on January 6th to start a civil war or to take hostages, or any of those indicia of a civil war.

I mean, I know what the record is here. There is a record of his rhetoric, and then there is a record of his conduct on January 6th.

I mean, you really don't have to convince me that he didn't take affirmative steps on January 6th to do the things that he had listed as part of his -- the government called it a "manifesto," I am not going to call it a manifesto -- I am going to call it a plan of action and rules engagement.

MR. BURNHAM: Say no more, Your Honor. I will conclude. That was exactly the message I was trying to get across.

I will mention one more thing about social media that I can't resist. I do take umbrage that the government included this without qualification: Men with guns need to
shoot their way in; that's a part of their sentencing memo.
As Your Honor recalls, the case agent testified that that was not in relation to January 6th, that came out in cross-examination; and the government included that without that bit of context, so I want to provide it.

THE COURT: Go ahead. Don't stop. I am just looking up something.

I believe that on January 6th itself, he said: Patriots on the Capitol. Patriots storming. Men with guns need to shoot their way in.

MR. BURNHAM: That's right.
The "mens with guns need to shoot their way in" -on cross-examination the agent testified that was in response to -- someone had sent him a link or a news story, or something about observers being physically barred from counting locations in Georgia, and that was what it was in reference to, not the United States Capitol.

THE COURT: Right. But it's in reference to resisting the election results.

MR. BURNHAM: In Georgia, yes.
So a few comments on -- on the rest of the facts of this case.

Notably, you know, some of the most disturbing rhetoric that you heard from different people that day, "Where is Nancy?" "Hang Mike Pence." He didn't participate
in any of that, right? Occasionally, it was going on where he was at least a couple of times. He didn't participate in any of that.

And I know Your Honor has read this several times, but I can't move on without at least reviewing, you know, some of his actions that day that I think are worthy of repetition. I won't belabor it, but we -- we saw the way he behaved in there.

The minute he entered the upper part of the Senate, his first reaction was: "Nobody destroys anything, we got to show respect." Then he goes back out and sees the fight with a pretty scary looking guy, a comic book villain-looking guy, attacking two police officers; and he physically intervened at some risk to himself. That's highly significant, distinguishes him from -- I'm getting ahead of myself to disparity; that's something you don't see too much in these cases.

And then, on the Senate Floor, "Get out of that chair. That's not your chair, that's the Vice President's chair. We have got to show respect."

We would argue that the video of him allegedly rifling through the papers on the desk showed him picking up papers on the floor and putting them back on the desk -it's a question of interpretation, but we'd allege that's what that was. It was consistent with -- with all of his
rhetoric that day.
And then, even on his way out, I think -- there is no sound, but the last two or three videos the government showed I think can reasonably be interpreted as consistent with him trying to find a way out.

You know, he comes in, and then he's on the Senate Floor, and then he is just sort of wandering the halls for a while; and that's what he appears to be doing. I don't think the Court should have any trouble concluding the one young lady who told him to stop -- he easily could not have -- have heard her. It's not believable to me that he was disregarding her instructions and ignoring her.

It was noisy in there that day. His body language -- he didn't run away from her. I just think he didn't hear her. That's, I think, the way I would interpret that, especially since there was another video right before that where -- he essentially said the picture --

THE COURT: I understand the point. But he wasn't spending the whole 37 minutes trying to get out of the Capitol.

MR. BURNHAM: Yeah. I think maybe it would be the past 10 -- the last 10 or 15, that is what he appears to be doing, especially since the final video in the Capitol is him leaving willingly.

He is standing in line; he is waiting to get out.

And on his way out you see this guy -- he looks like he's drunk; I think he might actually have been teargassed. But he's confronting the officers, and Mr. Brock is -literally, his last act was to -- you know, he sort of takes that guy around the shoulder, pats him. You can see him talking to him, and he diffuses that situation even on the way out. So all of those things are significant.

And where all of this is sort of leading is in a case where he's one of a thousand people. The disparities analysis gets very complicated very fast, but it's -- it's important, and so I will offer the Court our take on how to do the disparities analysis.

So here -- here is the starting point. First of all, there is a long tradition of people protesting in the Capitol. Not with this number people, certainly, but there is a long tradition of protesting at the Capitol; Code Pink, Vietnam, Pro-life, Pro-Choice. It happens, and --

THE COURT: Correction. That's mainly a tradition of protesting at the Capitol, not in the Capitol.

MR. BURNHAM: Well, with Code Pink and --
THE COURT: There is no tradition of protesting at the Capitol when the Capitol is closed to the public, that's not part of the American tradition.

MR. BURNHAM: I can't think of a counterexample to that. But there are people that have, you know, interrupted
the session, Code Pink, Kavanaugh --
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. BURNHAM: -- and usually it's handled as misdemeanors in superior court, and that's not totally inconsistent with the way the majority of individuals have been charged here.

The starting point, I think from the government's exercise of prosecutorial discretion, is: If you walked in, you looked around, you didn't break anything or you didn't have a criminal record, you didn't -- weren't rude or aggressive to police -- you got a misdemeanor and, usually, a misdemeanor with no jail.

If you look at the government's sentencing charts, page after page: Probation, house arrest; probation, house arrest. It goes and goes and goes. So that's sort of the starting point.

And so the starting point to my analysis is what distinguishes Mr. Brock from that. And the first thing -this comes from the government -- is he went to the Senate Floor, so he gets the obstruction felony.

THE COURT: I think the first thing that distinguishes it is he was convicted of a felony. MR. BURNHAM: That's right.

THE COURT: Because you just said: Misdemeanor, misdemeanor, misdemeanor. He was convicted of a felony, as
well as misdemeanor.

MR. BURNHAM: Well, that's why he was charged with the felony. I think the government would not dispute this: We're going to charge him with a felony because he went on the Senate Floor; that was the real drive.

Because I think it was not the social media. Maybe the government can contradict me. But I don't think he was charged with a felony because of social media because that applies in many, many cases. Maybe it wasn't to the same extent. But I had conversations with the government, that's their consistent charging policy.

And so I think there could be counter arguments to that, is -- why does -- you know, is that really so much that he has to be a felon for life and someone that wandered around the Rotunda and the offices and all the hallways gets to have a misdemeanor, but we'll work with that. They're the government, they made that decision.

My first contention to the Court is not only making him a felon because he peacefully entered a Senate that had adjourned, but giving him, in their view, five years in jail creates an unwarranted disparity by several orders of magnitude between him and the 5 or 600 people who just got misdemeanors with no jail.

THE COURT: I am going to save you some time.
You don't have to argue against the government's
request for a 60 -month sentence. He is not going to get a 60-month sentence.

MR. BURNHAM: Thank you, Your Honor. I appreciate that.

But even a much smaller sentence, even if it was 12 months or 20 -- a guidelines sentence, let's say -- you know, person A walks down the hall and walks by the offices and walks through the Rotunda and gets a misdemeanor probation, and person $B$ peacefully goes in and out of an unoccupied Senate, gets a felony plus two years. I would just submit to the Court that's too much of a disparity between people that are similarly situated in most respects. That's the first point on our view of the disparities analysis.

The second point is there is --
THE COURT: You want to -- the disparity under $3553(a)(6)$ doesn't work the way you have just described it. It's not a disparity between someone who is charged with one offense and someone who is not charged with that offense; it's comparing people who are charged and convicted of the same things.

MR. BURNHAM: I think it says convicted of similar conduct, doesn't it?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BURNHAM: So that's my contention. Even if
the charges are different, the conduct is similar, that would be the contention.

THE COURT: Well, I am not sure -- I'm not sure I have seen cases that do that comparison that you are trying to do, saying that, oh, Individual A did this kind of conduct but was charged with a felony, and Individual B did this kind of conduct but was only charged with a misdemeanor. That's selective prosecution-type argument, that is not a disparity in sentencing-type argument under 3553 (a) (6).

MR. BURNHAM: Well, let's make it easier.
We can totally ignore the charges, that's -- that will make it an easier analysis, and the same argument still applies.

If Person A walks down the hall wherever he walks and gets probation, Person B, you know, peacefully goes into the Senate, tries to keep order in the Senate, peacefully walks out. Maybe you can make an argument that that person should be treated a little bit more harshly than the person who didn't go in the Senate, it is the Senate after all. But my suggestion to the Court is going from probation to two years or three years is far and away beyond anything called for by the disparity and conduct. So we don't even have to get into the disparity and charges. I think that becomes relevant when it comes to collateral consequences.

But for the disparities analysis, we can easily ignore that part of it.

Secondly, there is precedent in this court for felony January 6th defendants receiving non-incarceration, or very close to it. And I have cited to the two cases I am aware of where Your Honor's colleagues have taken that step and -- you know, no two cases are exactly alike, there are always points that differ.

But taking all of the 3553 --

THE COURT: One of them is a case where the judge took into account the fact that the defendant had autism.

MR. BURNHAM: That's right. That's right.
And so the view -- and that was a case of mine, so I am familiar with it. But the -- my analysis of that case is -- the autism was obviously highly significant. Mr. Brock is not autistic; clearly, he is not. So you put that on one side. But that individual in that case didn't have mitigating factors approaching Mr. Brock's military record, and he committed destruction of property and was in the first wave of people that came -- he was number 12, I think.

So there is a difference of mitigating and aggravating factors on both sides in every case. But when you balance it out, I think Mr. Brock has about as good a case for non-incarceration or very short incarceration or
home detention as any felony defendant to come through the courthouse.

I think he, if anything, has perhaps a little bit better case than the two individuals who have received that, particularly because -- and this is I think -- he has mitigating factors that I think are -- I mean, I didn't even mention, in my 3553 analysis, protecting the police, keeping order. I mean, there are all sorts of ways to distinguish him.

And I think that analysis becomes even stronger when you look at collateral consequences that apply in this case that don't apply in many, many other cases. The most simple one is Mr. Brock was on home detention already for seven months, I think, which is a stronger -- more stringent conditions of release than what other Capitol defendants got in this case. The starting point, from what I have seen anyway --

THE COURT: I took him off of home detention.

MR. BURNHAM: That's right. Your Honor did, and we appreciated that.

But it was -- you know, he served some time on, basically, house arrest-type conditions, and that's -that's some people's whole sentence, and he has already done seven months of that. That's the first one.

The second one -- and we mentioned this in our
sentencing memo. He was an airline pilot; they are very handsomely compensated. They make a good living. And then he had to start over as a 50-something man and become a home inspector.

And so effectively what that works out to is -you know, a lot of people -- if you get a felony conviction, it's not good for your career. But I -- the numbers are in the presentence report. That works out to roughly a 100,000 fine a year for the rest of his life, probably. He might get his license back, but it's not looking good. Probably for the foreseeable future his standard of living drops several pegs, and it's most likely going to stay that way. And that's a significant collateral consequence that -- to that extent, $I$ don't think you see that in the general run of cases here, and that is particular to him.

THE COURT: So do you think that two defendants who are otherwise equal but one of them has a high paying job and the other one doesn't, the fact that the one with a high paying job because of a felony conviction no longer can have that high paying job entitles him to a lower sentence?

Is that your argument?
MR. BURNHAM: I think it's a relevant factor. All else equal -- you don't want to treat rich people, they get less but --

THE COURT: That's what you are arguing for.

MR. BURNHAM: I think all else equal, if that was the only difference -- yes, I absolutely do think it would weigh in because it's directly relevant to 3553. Just punishment, right? -- it's relevant to that. If it's just that he suffer because of his wrongdoing, that's some suffering so it reduces the Court's need to inflict more just punishment. Deterrence, it's relevant to deterrence; it's specific and general, clearly. Respect for the law. I mean, it's logically relevant to multiple 3553 factors.

I said in my sentencing memo that he was expelled from the Association of Air Force Academy graduates. The presentence report did say there was -- that the process to kick him out had started. Somebody contacted me from that organization and said, no, he is still a member; so I guess he is still a member of that. But his ability to become a member -- you know, a part of the veteran community has been significant curtailed because of this case.

The last point $I$ will mention is probably the most subtle, but it might be the most important collateral consequence. I think Mr. Brock has become sort of one of the faces of January 6th in the public mind because he happened to be -- he is tall, you know, he stands out. He was photographed carrying the Flex Cuffs that we now know where he got them, but very few people that are not in this courtroom are going to appreciate that backstory, and it was
all over the media. So he is one of the five or ten people that were there that day --

THE COURT: You are saying that that's because he was tall and carrying the Flex Cuffs. I would add because he had tactical vest and helmet on and because he is a retired lieutenant colonel in the Air Force.

MR. BURNHAM: Sure. I grant all of that. But the comparison I was setting up is there were literally hundreds of people there that day who not only were wearing much more --

THE COURT: I think the numbers are probably more than hundreds, but go ahead, sir.

MR. BURNHAM: More than hundreds who were wearing similar and even more, you know --

THE COURT: I'm sorry. I interrupted you midstream. I apologize.

MR. BURNHAM: Not at all. Any time. I am happy to take direction from the Court.

But there were many people dressed like he was that day. And there were many people who were -- by orders of magnitude more culpable, by anybody's -- there were, you know, Nazis there that day; there were people fighting with police. There were people who dismantled the bike racks by force. There were people who were neo-Confederates, I mean, we could go on and on -- criminal records; and nobody knows
their names, nobody remembers who they were. Most of those people pass through this courthouse and they're not in the public imagination; but because of the way his case has been covered, he is. He is going to have to live that forever. And I could go on and on about how that's redounded to his detriment in his custody proceedings. It's been used against him in his personal life, professionally -- and that's not going away; the internet is there forever.

And I would argue that he has been
disproportionately presented as one of the worst actors from January 6th -- or one of the top ten worst actors, which does not reflect reality, but he is going to have to live with that.

So it's a complicated analysis when you have a complicated case with a thousand other comparable cases. But I think, by any 3553 analysis, he is at the very bottom in terms of culpability of any felony defendant, and that's why we would ask Your Honor to sentence him as such.

Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Burnham.
And, now, if Mr. Brock wants to say something, this would be his chance to do so.

MR. BURNHAM: He would love to address the Court, but since we do have to discuss whether we will be appealing -- this is all on the record -- I have advised him
not to. He will not be -- not be speaking, respectfully. THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Burnham. MR. BURNHAM: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. We have been at this for a while, but now I need to take into account everything that's been said and reach some and express some conclusions.

Let me say a couple of things before I ask
Mr. Brock and Mr. Burnham to come up to the lectern. I have a couple of things $I$ have to say first.

Do you need a second to talk to counsel?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. So I have received a lot of information through not only the comments here today but, also, through the presentence report, through the sentencing memos provided by each side, through a proffer of some support for Mr. Brock that I have taken into account because I did review the substance of that proffer; and all of that is important to me in assessing the appropriate sentence in this case.

I will start with restitution. There is a documented and well-founded, approximately, $\$ 2.8$ million loss caused by the events at the Capitol on January 6, 2021. And like other judges in other similar cases dealing with this kind of conduct, I am going to order restitution, under the applicable statutes, in the amount of $\$ 2,000$ here.

With respect to a fine, I have reviewed the available information. It's not always that extensive, but I have reviewed what is available. And I have decided that in addition to that restitution payment, $I$ do not think there is a real ability to pay a fine, and I will not impose a fine in this case.

That brings me to the reasons for and the sentence that will be imposed beyond the restitution amount.

I will go through this one time and then give the counsel any opportunity to make any legal objection before I formally impose the sentence, but I will not go through it a second time. In giving the sentence, I would like Mr. Brock and his counsel to come up to the lectern please. Up here.

It bears repeating briefly but doesn't need a lot of repetition to say that the conduct we're talking about, the events of January 6, 2021, were extremely serious. Extremely serious. They represent an attack on our democratic values and our democratic institutions, and the Capitol is one of those most cherished of institutions of our democracy.

It was an attack on and an attempt to undermine and frustrate the peaceful transition of power from presidential administration to presidential administration that is a hallmark of our democracy and our governmental process.

It was a mob engaged in a riot, and all of that has to be taken seriously by the criminal justice system. There is no avoiding it; it has to be taken seriously by the criminal justice system. The number of cases brought, the results of those cases reflect that serious criminal justice enterprise, and this is just part of that effort.

Now, we have before this Court today Mr. Brock. He has no meaningful prior criminal conduct, none of any kind. He has been employed through his adult life; he is well educated. He has got substantial community contributions that are reflected in the presentence investigation report and otherwise, in materials the Court has reviewed. He has a distinguished military service to his country, and that is important and is something that courts should take account of when deciding an appropriate sentence for conduct that brings someone into the criminal justice system. All of that is of great importance in this sentencing.

The sentencing guidelines I have already gone through; they lead, in the Court's calculation, to a sentencing range of 24 to 30 months. I don't have to follow the guidelines, but they are something that is viewed generally as being reasonable, in terms of sentencing, for the particular offense.

And probation, based on a higher guideline range,
asked for a sentence of 48 months -- recommended that sentence. I don't believe they're recommending a sentence that high any longer.

The government is still, nonetheless, asking for a sentence of 60 months, notwithstanding my calculation of a much lower sentencing guideline range.

The defendant is requesting a sentence of home confinement based on their assessment and calculation of a lower guideline range but still, $I$ take it, asking for a sentence of home confinement.

So I am going to have to go through this in some detail but not great detail because the pre-January 6th, extending all the way up to January 6th, communications that Mr. Brock engaged in are, indeed, very troubling. I can't escape them. I can't just put them off as: Oh, they weren't serious; oh, he didn't follow through on them; oh, he never really intended anything along those lines. It's serious stuff, so I will go through a few of them.

Shortly after the election, on November 11th, 2020, one Facebook post he said: The battle isn't winnable democratically if they complete the steal. Fire and blood will be needed soon.

On December 24 th: I bought myself body armor and a helmet for the civil war that is coming.

On December 31st: We are now under occupation by
a hostile governing force; and then, quoting language against all enemies foreign and domestic. The message being that these are domestic enemies, these who are involved in running the government post the election results of November 2020. And he calls it a second civil war, not the only time he uses that term.

On January 1st, referring to January 6th he says: The castle will be stormed.

On January 5th: I really believe we're going to take back what they did on November 3. Plane is packed with people going to Stop the Steal.

On the date of the insurrection at the Capitol: Patriots on the Capitol. Patriots storming.

And then, in reference to counter-election result conduct in Georgia: Men with guns need to shoot their way in.

On other posts, looking back to November 9th: When we get to the bottom of this conspiracy, we need to execute the traitors that are trying to steal the election, and that includes the leaders of the media and social media aiding and abetting the coup plotters.

On December 5th: If SCOTUS doesn't act we have two choices, we can either live in a communist country or we can rebel. Keep the rightful president in power and demand free and fair elections. \#civilwar2021.

Then, already referred to by counsel, there is the December 24th, 2020, Facebook message to a fellow former military friend that sets out a plan of action and rules of engagement. Those are military concepts by a military -experienced military leader.

And among the plan -- the tasks of the plan of action are: Seize all democratic politicians and Biden key staff and select Republicans as well. Begin interrogations using methods we used on Al-Qaeda to gain evidence on the coup. Another task: Seize national media assets and key personnel, identifying personnel from CNN, Washington Post, New York Times editors. Eliminate them. Media silence, except for White House communications. Let the Democratic cities burn, cut off power and food to all who oppose us, establish provisional government.

And then the rules of engagement referred to earlier today: Do not kill LEO, standing for law enforcement officers, unless necessary. Gas would assist in this if we can get it. Attempt to capture Democrats with knowledge of coup. Shoot and destroy enemy nodes and key personnel.

Later, on December 27th: I prefer outright insurrection on this point.

On January 1st: Storm the castle. Help is on the way, January 6, 2021.

On January 3rd: Biden won't be inaugurated, we will ensure that on the 6th.

Just one or two more.
I may have repeated this already. On November 9th, a Facebook post: When we get to the bottom of this conspiracy, we need to execute the traitors that are trying to steal the election and that includes the leaders of the media and social media aiding and abetting the coup plotters. I think I did mention that already.

On December 6th, a Facebook post: No way in hell should we accept this rigged election. We need to restore the Constitution, and the best and shortest way is to go offensive on the communist that stole it, a/k/a the Democratic Party.

On December 7th: I think SCOTUS needs to see, if they don't act, that there will be blood.

This is chilling stuff, and it does reflect a purpose: To stop the certification of the election, particularly if the Congress and the Supreme Court don't act in the way that Mr. Brock believed would be appropriate.

This conduct on January 6th doesn't reflect all of that by any means. He did wear a tactical vest and a helmet. He did, for a time, carry Flex Cuffs that he acquired while there, not that he brought with him.

He entered the Capitol, clear from the evidence
that he was not entitled to do so. He did not have authority to do so.

He roamed throughout the Capitol. He was on the Senate Floor. He tried to open -- with keys that he had acquired apparently -- a door to the Senate Lobby. It happened to be the door that the Vice President was rushed out of in evacuating the Capitol proper during these events.

And, all told, he was in the Capitol for
37 minutes, a long time; not a quick entry and exit by any means.

On the other hand, no violent conduct, no property damage. And he tried, on more than one occasion, actually, to calm other rioters in order to avoid violent activity and conduct with law enforcement officers; and that is to his credit.

I do also acknowledge that some of the support for him speaks of his integrity. It speaks of it without taking into account the January 6th events, but it does speak to his integrity as a military officer in particular.

Normally, I think this -- given the guidelines here, we would be at the bottom of the guidelines and then would take several things into account: The fact that Mr. Brock does have some responsibilities with his family, in terms of the care of his parents; the fact that there was no violence that he engaged in and he actually avoided or
helped to try to avoid violent confrontations; and most importantly, his military service -- all of that would lead me to vary downward from the bottom of the guideline range.

But we have to take into account the rhetoric and the intent through his plan of action, to his rules engagement, and through other posts that is reflected in terms of his thinking and his mindset.

And I think it's especially reprehensible and, quite frankly, unbelievable coming from a former senior military officer. This kind of conduct that is contemplated and communicated in those detailed, repetitive posts -- it's really pretty astounding coming from a former high ranking military officer. It's detailed. It's persistent. It's consistent. And it's both astounding and atrocious. And that's coupled with the fact that he bought and then wore to the Capitol on January 6th a helmet and a tactical vest.

And we have no acceptance of responsibility and no showing of remorse whatsoever, zero.

All of that leads me to conclude that there should not be -- notwithstanding his military service and some of the other things that count in his favor -- there should not be a variance down from the guideline range. And, therefore, $I$ am going to sentence to 24 months on Count 1, and then concurrent sentences on the other counts of 12 months on Counts 2 and 3, and 6 months on Counts 4, 5,
and 6; but that's all concurrent to the 24 -month sentence on Count 1.

In addition, supervised release on Count 1 will be 24 months; on Counts 2 and 3, 12 months. There is no supervised release that applies to Counts 4, 5, and 6. All of that, too, will be concurrent.

So is this a sentence that is consistent with 3553 and all of the considerations that have to be taken into account under that statutory provision, and $I$ believe it is.

I believe it is a sentence that is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with all of the purposes set forth in that statute. It takes into account the nature and circumstances of the offense and all of Mr. Brock's conduct relating to the January 6th events, the history and the characteristics of the defendant as reflected not just in his life as a military officer but, also, in the months preceding January 6th.

It considers the need to impose a sentence that reflects the seriousness of the offense, but will also promote respect for the law, for the rule of law, and to provide a just punishment for the offense. And, importantly, to provide both general and special -- or specific deterrence.

I understand that Mr. Brock has suffered some other consequences, that is true of a lot of criminal
defendants -- not just in the January 6th context, but otherwise. But I think this sentence -- the incarceration portion of this sentence -- does serve to afford adequate and necessary deterrence to criminal conduct by others, that's the general deterrence, and anything from Mr. Brock in the future; less important but, nonetheless, also specific deterrence with respect to him.

And then, finally, on the question of the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct -- as I said, that really requires looking at individuals who have been found guilty of similar conduct. And I take it to mean guilty of felonies, not comparing someone who was charged with a misdemeanor to someone who was charged with a felony.

I didn't get much help from the parties, and that's understandable because they were operating on the basis of different guideline calculations, and so they were comparing circumstances that weren't necessarily the same.

I have looked at the cases. And I think it's fair to say that a sentence of 24 months for this conduct involving how long Mr. Brock was in the Capitol, how he entered the Capitol, where he went in the Capitol, how he was dressed, and what he said repeatedly beforehand with respect to his intent and his purposes -- I think the
sentence of 24 months is perfectly consistent. Indeed, it may be at the low end of sentences given to defendants having similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.

So, with that, I am going to now read the sentence that will be imposed.

Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and in consideration of the provisions of 18 U.S.C. Section 3553 that I have just gone through, as well as the Advisory Sentencing Guidelines, it is the judgment of the Court that you, Larry Rendall Brock, are hereby committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for concurrent terms of 24 months, that is two years, on Count 1; 12 months, that's one year, on Counts 2 and 3; and 6 months on Counts 4, 5, and 6; and those are concurrent terms.

You are further sentenced to serve concurrent terms of supervised release of 24 months on Count 1, and 12 months on each of Counts 2 and 3. Again, concurrent.

In addition, you are ordered to pay special assessments, as is statutorily required, that totals \$180, in accordance with Title 18 of the U.S. Code Section 3013. That is $\$ 100$ for Count 1; $\$ 25$ for Count 2; $\$ 25$ for Count 3; and $\$ 10$ for each of Counts 4, 5, and 6.

While on supervision, you shall abide by the following mandatory conditions, as well as all discretionary
conditions recommended by the probation office in Part D, sentencing options of the presentence report, which are imposed to establish the basic expectations for your conduct while on supervision.

The mandatory conditions include that you must not commit another federal, state, or local crime; you must not unlawfully possess a controlled substance; you must refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance; you must submit to one drug test within 15 days of placement on supervision, and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter as determined by the Court; you must cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer; and you must make restitution in accordance with 18 U.S.C. Section 3663 and $3663(a)$, or any other statute authorizing a sentence of restitution.

You shall comply with the following special conditions: You shall complete 100 hours of community service within 18 months of the start of supervision. The probation officer will supervise the participation in the program by approving the program. You must provide written verification of completed hours to the probation officer.

You must provide the probation officer access to any requested financial information and authorize the release of any financial information. The probation office may share financial information with the United States

Attorney's Office.
Within 60 days of release from incarceration or placement on supervision, you will appear before the Court for a reentry progress hearing. Prior to the hearing, the probation officer will submit a report summarizing your status and compliance with the release conditions.

If you are supervised by a district outside of Washington, D.C., or this metropolitan area, the United States Probation Office in that district will submit a progress report to the Court within 60 days of the commencement of supervision. Upon receipt of the progress report, the Court will determine if your appearance is required.

You are ordered to make restitution to -- I'm sorry -- that's an extra order.

You are ordered to make restitution in the amount of $\$ 2,000$ to the Architect of the Capitol. The Court determined that you do not have the ability to pay interest and, therefore, waives any interest or penalties that may accrue on the balance. Restitution payments shall be made to the Clerk of the Court for the United States District Court, District of Columbia, for disbursement to the following victim, and that is the Architect of the Capitol at the appropriate address in the Ford House Office Building here in Washington; and the amount is $\$ 2,000$. You must pay
the balance of any restitution at a rate of no less than \$100 per month.

The Court finds that you do not have the ability to pay a fine and, therefore, waives imposition of a fine in this case.

The financial obligations are immediately payable to the Clerk of the Court for the U.S. District Court here at the address in Washington, D.C. Within 30 days of any change of address you shall notify the Clerk of the Court of the change until such time as the financial obligation is paid in full.

The probation office shall release the presentence investigation report to all appropriate agencies, and that includes the United States Probation Office in the approved district of residence in order to execute the sentence of the Court. Treatment agencies shall return the presentence report to the probation office upon the defendant's completion or termination from treatment.

Now, Mr. Brock, you were convicted after a bench trial. You have the right to appeal your conviction, as has already been mentioned here today. You also have the right to appeal the sentence that I have imposed.

You have the right to apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. And if you so request and were to qualify, the Clerk of the Court would prepare and file a notice of
appeal on your behalf. But I do note that you are represented by very able counsel here today who, presumably, will assist you in that process if you wish to follow it.

With few exceptions, any notice of appeal must be filed within 14 days of the entry of judgment; and I expect that judgment will be entered maybe today, probably not. But if not today, then early next week.

With that, let me ask counsel if there are any reasons, other than reasons that have already been stated and argued here, why the sentence should not be imposed as I have just indicated?

Mr. Burnham?
MR. BURNHAM: Nothing other than previously
stated.

THE COURT: And for the government?
MS. AYERS-PEREZ: I have no reasons, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Then are there questions as to anything else that we should cover before I formally impose the sentence?

There are no counts to be dismissed.
Is there any request with respect to a place of incarceration?

MR. BURNHAM: I would just state as close as possible consistent with custody points to Grapevine, Texas.

THE COURT: All right. And I will make that
recommendation.

MR. BURNHAM: And then we have one other request, it's a request for self-surrender. The government has not --

THE COURT: We'll deal with that in just a second, okay?

There was one other question that occurred to me, but it's escaping me at the moment.

No programs that you would be asking for in -during incarceration?

MR. BURNHAM: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. And is there anything else from the government?

MS. AYERS-PEREZ: There is nothing else, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Then I, therefore, order that the sentence is imposed as I have just stated it, with that recommendation with respect to the placement of incarceration. And that is the sentence of the Court.

We then deal with the question of his status pending -- or from this date forward.

Is there a request -- and you can have a seat, Mr. Brock; you don't have to stand there any longer. Mr. Burnham, you can as well.

Is there any request from the government that you
wish to make?

MS. AYERS-PEREZ: I have no requests, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. I assume that the request from the defense, as just intimated, is for self-surrender.

MR. BURNHAM: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. And I think in this circumstance, given Mr. Brock's history and his compliance with his conditions of release, $I$ think self-surrender is warranted. And I will order that he report for service of sentence in the future.

You will remain under the same conditions that you are under at this time, that means that you are released pending reporting for that date, and you need to continue to comply with those conditions. Failure to do so could subject you to serious consequences, as has been explained before.

You will have a date to report. If you fail to report on that date for service of the sentence, that's a separate criminal offense. You need to be aware of that.

And lastly, as you have been reminded in other contexts and as I remind everyone in these circumstances, if you were to commit a crime while on release under the conditions that you will be under -- that could subject you to more serious penalties for that crime than you otherwise would face.

With that, I believe we are done for today, unless there is anything else.

First, from the government?

MS. AYERS-PEREZ: I have nothing further,

Your Honor.

THE COURT: From the defense?

MR. BURNHAM: Nothing further, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything from probation?

MS. WILLETT: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I thank you all very much.

And I thank those who have been in attendance today, some of whom, I will assume, are in support of Mr. Brock. He will continue to need that support. We will wish him well when he completes all aspects of his obligations resulting from the conduct on January 6th.

With that, a good day to everyone. That completes these proceedings. Thank you.

THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: This Honorable Court stands in recess until the return of Court.
(Whereupon, the proceeding concludes, 1:03 p.m.)

## CERTIFICATE

I, ELIZABETH SAINT-LOTH, RPR, FCRR, do hereby certify that the foregoing constitutes a true and accurate transcript of my stenographic notes, and is a full, true, and complete transcript of the proceedings to the best of my ability.

This certificate shall be considered null and void if the transcript is disassembled and/or photocopied in any manner by any party without authorization of the signatory below.

Dated this 8th day of May, 2023.
/s/ Elizabeth Saint-Loth, RPR, FCRR Official Court Reporter


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