A Reminder for Trump’s Critics: Years of Diplomacy Ended in a Nuclear North Korea

A Reminder for Trump’s Critics: Years of Diplomacy Ended in a Nuclear North Korea

While hindsight is, as they say, 20/20, there is real value in confronting crises as they unfold. Over the course of North Korea’s rise to nuclear power status, there were several critical junctures at which stronger, bolder, and more decisive action by U.S. presidents might have prevented the regime from acquiring the bomb.

In a weekend op-ed, The Wall Street Journal editorial board examined North Korea’s path to a nuclear weapon, highlighting the unwillingness of successive U.S. administrations to act at key moments — and the consequences of that inaction. The editors drew comparisons to Iran, arguing that there are “limits to diplomacy with a determined foe,” and warning that serious risks arise when leaders prioritize “conflict avoidance above all else.”

They concluded that, as risky as President Donald Trump’s decision to use military force when diplomacy failed was, “the strangely forgotten U.S. experience with North Korea suggests the alternatives were even riskier.”

The first sign that the Hermit Kingdom was pursuing a nuclear program came in 1984.

Under global pressure, dictator Kim Il Sung joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) the next year. This was seen as a sign of Pyongyang’s peaceful intent, even as it delayed adopting nuclear safeguards.

It was a meaningless gesture, and North Korea continued to work toward a nuclear weapon. “In 1993 it denied inspectors access to camouflaged nuclear sites. … Facing tough questions, Pyongyang announced it would withdraw from the NPT.”

The Clinton Administration began negotiations with Kim, which accomplished nothing.

Bill Clinton threatened sanctions. The U.S. military drew up plans for strikes on nuclear installations, and Defense Secretary Bill Perry presented a plan for a large military buildup in the region. Mr. Clinton canceled talks and deployed Patriot missile-defense systems to South Korea.

…

Enter Jimmy Carter. The former President informed the Clinton Administration that he intended to take up a prior offer from the North Koreans to visit and try to defuse the situation. Mr. Clinton decided to let Carter proceed as a private citizen, thinking it might give Kim a chance to back down. Instead Mr. Clinton found himself cornered politically.

Carter feared conflict above all and even opposed sanctions. He went beyond what he had been authorized by Mr. Clinton to discuss and announced a tentative agreement with Kim — on CNN. The press and foreign-policy establishment hailed nuclear peace in our time. [Where have we heard that before?]

Military options came off the table and Mr. Clinton embraced the deal, which became the 1994 Agreed Framework. North Korea consented to freeze its illicit nuclear work and eventually allow full inspections in exchange for a multibillion-dollar package of civilian nuclear power and oil. The U.S. set aside the question of whether North Korea had a bomb’s worth of plutonium and ignored its NPT violations. The regime would mellow over time with economic engagement, some said. Besides, who wanted another Korean war?

The editors suggest that Clinton chose not to use force out of concern that it would trigger a North Korean attack on Seoul, a South Korean city of 10 million within easy striking distance.

An X user makes a similar point in the analysis below.

Iran was trying to use the North Korean model to get a nuke: create sufficient conventional deterrence so you won’t be challenged in acquiring one (it’s called the Seoul Hostage Problem).

This has been explained over and over since day one.

Everyone claiming shifting goalposts… https://t.co/e2ufjfgoBs

— Gummi (@gummibear737) April 1, 2026

By 2002, the regime was still seeking a weapon. Confronted by the Bush administration, Kim Jong Il reneged on the Agreed Framework.

Kim Jong Il, the son of Kim Il Sung, expelled inspectors, withdrew from the NPT and resumed plutonium work. Mr. Bush employed threats, sanctions and diplomacy but ultimately ruled out the use of force. North Korea quadrupled its plutonium stockpile and in 2006 conducted its first nuclear test.

After that, U.S. military options became riskier. North Korea pressed on. It is now believed to possess some 50 warheads, and it tests ICBMs that will one day be able to reach the continental U.S. The latest missile test came Sunday.

So, two consecutive administrations avoided using force against North Korea, judging it to be too risky, and as a result, allowed it to acquire a nuclear weapon.

For nearly half a century, every U.S. president has been acutely aware that the Iranian regime would ultimately have to be confronted over its pursuit of a nuclear program. Yet until Trump, no one acted. Aware of the scale of the challenge — and the political capital it would demand — each administration chose delay over decision, kicking the can further down the road.

Few presidents would choose to initiate a major war nine months before a high-stakes midterm election, one already shaping up to be difficult for their party. Trump could have waited for a more politically convenient moment to strike Iran, as most presidents would have. But at what cost to American national security, or to global stability?

By the time Trump faced the choice, there was scarcely any road left. Waiting until after the midterm elections would likely have meant accepting a nuclear-armed regime.

Rather than condemning Trump for acting, critics should recognize the courage and the resolve it required — and applaud him for putting America’s best interests ahead of his own political goals.

While Operation Midnight Hammer last June may have delayed Iran’s path to a bomb, intelligence showed the regime had quickly resumed its program at alternate sites.

An Iranian negotiator even boasted to Special Envoy Steve Witkoff that Iran had 460 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium — enough for 11 nuclear weapons.

At the same time, a more immediate threat was emerging. Iran’s missile and drone production was surging. Fueled by Chinese manufacturing and financial support, the regime was expanding its arsenal by the day.

As Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned in the first week of the war, Iran was producing about 100 ballistic missiles a month — putting it on track to surpass 5,000 by 2027.

That scale, he argued, would upend the strategic balance. Tehran could swamp even advanced missile defenses through sheer volume, making nuclear weapons almost beside the point. With such an arsenal, the regime could intimidate its neighbors, deter retaliation, and challenge the international order with increasing confidence.

At that point, Rubio concluded, nuclear or not, Iran could effectively thumb its nose at the world. Delay would only have worked to Iran’s advantage. The longer the wait, the more dangerous the regime would become.

The Journal pointed out the similarities between Iran’s strategy of building up its ballistic missile inventory to bully the world and Pyongyang’s threat to strike Seoul to deter U.S. military action.

At some point, a leader must stand up and do what’s necessary, regardless of the risk. Diplomacy had failed, deterrence had eroded, and delay would likely have produced a more dangerous, better-armed adversary.

Trump’s choice was not between war and peace, but between acting now or confronting a far more deadly enemy later.

The Journal concluded: “We don’t know how the current Iran conflict will end, but we do know Iran’s radical regime will not have a nuclear program when it’s over. This has made the world a safer place.”

Indeed.

Elizabeth writes commentary for Legal Insurrection and The Washington Examiner. She is an academy fellow at The Heritage Foundation. Please follow Elizabeth on X or LinkedIn.

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