The Birth of the United States Air Force from the U.S. Army Signal Corps
A look at the USAF’s early years, the “Bomber Mafia”, and General Curtis LeMay.
Happy 250th anniversary to the U.S. Army!
I must admit, I had not really planned anything special for today. Then I was bombarded with the tiresome “No King” protest inanity promoted by the Democrats and supported by leftists, wokeists, and TDS-sufferers. So, here I am, with a special post to share to commemorate the occasion and to celebrate American achievement.
When my son first attended the U.S. Air Force Academy, I first learned about the origins of the US Air Force (USAF), the “Bomber Mafia”, and the role of General Curtis LeMay in implementing strategic bombing. It seems appropriate to reflect upon the origins of this branch during today’s festivities.
The United States Air Force (USAF) traces its origins to early 20th-century military aviation, beginning with the U.S. Army Signal Corps’ establishment of an Aeronautical Division in 1907, to oversee military ballooning and air machines. Over the following decades, the Army’s air arm evolved through several organizational changes (most notably as the Army Air Service in World War I and the Army Air Corps).
During World War II, the Army Air Forces (AAF) became a nearly autonomous branch within the Army. Leaders like General Henry “Hap” Arnold wielded significant influence and resources during the war. After the conclusion of that war, the AAF ultimately morphed into the USAF, which was officially established as an independent branch of the U.S. military by the National Security Act of 1947, and the personnel from the AAF were formally transferred to the new Department of the Air Force.
“The Bomber Mafia” was one of the most intriguing books I read during this time, and it focuses on the transitions from how people thought air power would be used before World War II and how it actually came to be used. The “Bomber Mafia” refers to a close-knit group of American military officers who, in the decades before and during World War II, strongly believed that long-range heavy bomber aircraft could decisively win wars through precision bombing of key enemy targets. This group was centered at the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) in Alabama and included influential figures such as Major General Haywood S. Hansell.
The Bomber Mafia argued that targeting critical industrial and transportation hubs (so-called “choke points”) from high altitude and in daylight could cripple an enemy’s economy and war-making capacity, potentially ending wars more quickly and with less bloodshed than traditional ground combat. Hansell, the leader of the Bomber Mafia, championed precision bombing as a humane and effective strategy when he led the air forces during World War II.
In practice, the Bomber Mafia’s vision of precision bombing was not achieved during World War II due to technological limitations, poor weather, and effective enemy defenses. Hansell’s campaign over Japan was ultimately deemed unsuccessful by his superiors due to a lack of decisive results, and he was replaced by General Curtis LeMay, who shifted to nighttime firebombing tactics paired with the use of napalm, which had been created by Harvard University chemists.
LeMay was the architect of the devastating firebombing campaign against Japanese cities, most notably the firebombing of Tokyo in March 1945, which killed approximately 100,000 people and destroyed vast swaths of the city. Throughout the spring and summer of 1945, his B-29 bombers continued relentless nighttime incendiary raids, targeting urban industrial centers and effectively destroying much of Japan’s war industry and infrastructure.
By the time of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima (August 6, 1945) and Nagasaki (August 9, 1945), LeMay was commanding all strategic air operations against the Japanese home islands. The preparations for these atomic attacks were carried out under his overall command, and the same B-29 units he led were used for both the firebombing and atomic missions.
After the war, LeMay held key positions in the newly created USAF. He served as the head of research and development, then commanded U.S. air forces in Europe during the early Cold War, where he initiated the Berlin Airlift in 1948. His most significant contribution, however, was as commander of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) from 1948 to 1957.
LeMay transformed SAC into a highly disciplined, always-ready nuclear strike force, building new bases, expanding training, and instituting rigorous standards for personnel and equipment. LeMay’s leadership was marked by his insistence on constant readiness and his belief that airpower and nuclear deterrence were essential to preventing war with the Soviet Union.
More here, for those of you interested.
Once again, happy anniversary to the US Army. I am looking forward to watching the livestream of the parade!
U.S. Army’s 250th Birthday Parade: Events will be livestreamed on all U.S. Army social media platforms and the official website. News outlets will also stream the parade. Coverage begins at 6 p.m. ET ( 3 p.m. PT), 30 minutes before the parade starts, and will include the full… pic.twitter.com/ZtTqf5nwix
— Leslie Eastman ☥ (@Mutnodjmet) June 13, 2025
Image by perplexity.ai.
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Comments
Ty Leslie..
My dad was a pilot in WWII. I wish I could have talked to him about that. Things have changed so much.
My dad a”h was a radar repairman in the Pacific Theater. I remember asking him why the shoulder badge on his uniform was for the Army Air Corps. “They ran out of Signal Corps badges,” he told me.
My dad was trained as a multi-engine pilot by the Army Air Force. He attended flight school with legendary Cowboys coach, Tom Landry. He flew B-24s in the South Pacific and then C-47s and other cargo planes in the Berlin Airlift.
Israel should be trying strategic bombing of Iran.
I believe they are. In fact, we have realized the strategic bombing objectives that the Bomber Mafia only dreamed of. If you are so inclined, read Malcom Gladwell’s book linked in the article above. A quick read but in depth analysis of the formation of the tactic.
I may be a bit behind the news but I don;t believe they have gone after iran’s energy, power
shipping, or water infrastructure. Also I don’t believe they’ve bombed factories other than missile/drone ones.
Not yet. Frankly, I’d rather the go after the Mullahs and IRGC. Leave the other stuff so a more amenable Iranian government could get established quickly
You basically said what I was about to write. I agree. Our, and Israel’s, issue is not with the Iranian-in-the-street.
You did leave out one important historical fact about the breakup – when the Air Force and Army were splitting except for in-house transport and spotter planes only in the future only the AF was to be allowed fixed-wing aircraft.
Which is why the Army does Attack Helicopters and the AF doesn’t.
Also why for decades the AF has repeatedly tried to retire their A-10 ground support warthogs despite them being so effective. It it doesn’t drop a bomb or shoot down a plane the AF doesn’t want to spend its allocation of funds on it. Screw the infantry.
Bob, up until the F-35 the A-10 could hang more different types of munitions off it’s wings than any other American plane. The real reason is the senior officers were all fighter jocks and the A-10 was the hero of Desert Storm, Gulf war 2, and Afghanistan. These senior generals also believe the F-35 can do everything an A-10 can. Where they are wrong is the F-35 does not have a gun like the GAU-8 Gatling gun.
Yup – the phrase “Jack of all trades but Master of none” leaps to mind.
With a tank-buster Gatling gun (cheaper than an AirToGround AT missile), ability to remain in the battles space for longer times and at speeds making for better accuracy on ground targets – and incredible ability to survive defensive ground fire and keep flying the A-10 is supurb in the ground SUPPORT role – whereas any jet configured to primarily air combat is – not.
Plus those “senior officers” are like the Navy senior officers of the 1930s-40s who were all Battleship commanders and didn’t see the utility of carriers. Until Pearl Harbour.
Recall that the A-10 was meant to slow down the Rooskie tanks pouring through the Fulda Gap. It was estimated that an A-10 pilot, once the war began, would have a median lifespan of about … four days.
During Gulf war 2 I was at Al Jabber. I was the NCOIC of the Network Operation Center and telephone switch systems. I had cut a deal with the A-10 pilots to put internet and telephones in their hooches. I wont go into what my commo guys got. My primary contact was a Captain Campbell and his callsign was Soup. After the war started he limped an A-10 back from Bagdad that was missing half a wing and most of it’s tail section and it was shot to hell. The landing gear did not work. He crash-landed the plane then jumped out of the cockpit wanting another A-10 to go back to Bagdad to finish the job
Cost of an A10 is 18.8M
Cost of a F35 is 109M
Max load of a F35 is 22K pounds in beast mode which kills stealth because of external hardpoints.
Max load of a A10 is 256K pounds
Which do I want to use for close air support?
An A-10 has more than three times the payload of a Boeing 767-300?
Hmmm… the first time I did a search it came up 256k. I just did one another way and it came up 16K which seems more realistic, So F35 can carry more than an A10.
I still know which one I want to use for close air support and which one I want to reserve for GPS or laser guided bombing.
The A-10 is such a workhorse and great aircraft. I wish they would build more.
They need to build an updated version around the GAU-8 that has more power and greater survivability. There are better engines than the turbofan used on the A-10.
Another part of the story is Billy Mitchell who advocated for an independent air force, irritated the hell out of the navy by claiming planes sink battleships, was court martialed, and died prematurely prior to WW2.
According to the Battleship Sailors running the Navy at the time, the only good uses for planes was to scout out the location of other ships and then possibly serve as spotters to direct battleship fire.
Yup. That why battleships and I believe some heavy cruisers carried a couple of scout planes.
Trump has a tendency to not accept the “general wisdom” in govt just because it’s been accepted for a few decades – for example look to his relocating the us embassy to Jerusalem despite the State Department assurances that that would make the Middle East go up in flames.
It’s clear that the AF doesn’t really want to do close ground support – not sexy enuf for the wanabe bomber and fighter pilots in charge. So they build Swiss Army Knife jets that cost more because they’re supposed to do everything well instead of ONE job really well for a lot less money.
You don’t really need (or want) a stealth jet to do CGS – in the battle space required to do it well the Mark I eyeball renders all that expensive stealth tech less useful and important than just making the jet a flying tank – like the warthog.
So…. it might be a Good Thing if he would have his guys revisit the Army/AF Key West Agreement of 1948 (revisited in 1966 to account for helicopters better).
Inter-service rivalry affects more than just college football – arguably WWII went a lot worse for Japan than otherwise because their Army and Navy couldn’t / wouldn’t coordinate well and kept moving support of each other to the back burner.
At this point returning the US Army/AF to a single command (like some other nations have) is likely a bridge too far – but we perhaps could split off assets that need to directly and immediately coordinate with ground forces to the control (and funding) of ground forces – like the A-10s – and any similar new generation of jet to replace it – or a reborn AC-47 or AC-130.
Left to its own devices the AF has always treated CGS planes like Cinderella was treated by her stepmom.
Perhaps an unwritten rule should be created that the AF Joint Chief can never be a fighter pilot. I suppose a bomber pilot would be ok because the bomber force is so much smaller than it used to be.
The other thing they should do is move close air support to the army and transfer the A10s to them. They already to close air support with helicopters and I assume osprey. For that matter how the hell would you classify an osprey since it is kind of both. Allow the army to have fixed wing aircraft for close air support (yes I believe the a10 can carry air to air missiles but that is an extra that shouldn’t “count”).
My father was in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy during World War II. My son was in Iraq twice and Afghanistan once. Both of them were in combat and both of them had problems with PTSD. I have often wondered what it would be like to listen to a conversation between them comparing experiences.
I enlisted in the USAF in 1969 because I was bored with school and knew I wouldn’t keep the 2-S deferment I had. Enlisting was one of the best decisions I ever made. Most of my eight years in RegAF were in F-111 integrated avionics and I still have friendships developed in the 1970s. Another sixteen years in Alabama Air National Guard was on optical sensors on RF-4C aircraft, also with many fond memories. I’m retired with a pension. The AF/ANG were good to me.
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